预付款众筹模式下新产品定价与质量设计

近几年预付款众筹在国内外发展迅速,但从生产运营角度研究的学术成果还相对缺乏.本文综合考虑新产品的众筹和销售(如果众筹成功)两个阶段,根据参与者预支付或购买选择的不同存在两种可能的市场均衡,据此,发起者可以制定两种定价策略.对比研究发现,当高估值顾客比例较低时,发起者会制定较低的众筹价格和较高的销售价格,反之,则应当制定比销售价格更高的众筹价格;而且,高估值顾客比例升高不一定会给发起者带来更多利润,只有当高估值顾客比例足够高时发起者才可能通过提高众筹价格来获得更多的收益.最后,本文拓展研究了当发起者考虑产品质量设计时所应采取的策略.研究发现,只有当高估值顾客比例较高时,发起者才有动力提高新产品质量设计;并且随着高估值顾客比例越来越高,发起者会不断提高新产品质量从而增加利润,如此可以实现双赢.

Pricing and quality design of new products under pre-sales crowdfunding

Relative to the rapid development of pre-sales crowdfunding in practice, there has been scant academic research. This paper is devoted to fill this gap by investigating funders' behaviors and the creator's operation strategies of pricing and quality design of the new product under pre-sales crowdfunding. The whole crowdfunding-related process consists of two phases:The crowdfunding phase and the selling phase. Main results of the base model show that:1) When the proportion of high-value funders is lower, the creator tends to set a lower crowdfunding price while a higher selling price, otherwise he will price higher in crowdfunding phase than in selling phase. 2) A higher proportion of high-value funders will not necessarily increase the creator's expected payoff. However, when the proportion of high-value funders is high enough, a higher proportion means more profit for the creator with a higher crowdfunding price. Finally, we extensively consider quality design as a new strategy for the creator and obtain some interesting findings. If the creator wants to raise expected payoff via designing a higher quality of the new product, it will be effective only when the proportion of high-value funders is high enough, and then the quality design strategy could lead to a win-win result for both creators and funders.