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随机回收和有限能力下逆向供应链定价及协调
引用本文:孙浩,达庆利.随机回收和有限能力下逆向供应链定价及协调[J].系统工程学报,2008,23(6).
作者姓名:孙浩  达庆利
作者单位:东南大学经济管理学院,江苏,南京,211189
摘    要:综合考虑回收量为回收价格的随机线性函数及回收商或制造商的设施有容量限制,分别针对回收商或制造商租用设施的两种情况,分析了Stackelberg博弈和集中式决策下逆向供应链中回收商的最优回收价格、制造商的最优回购价格及最优设施容量.研究表明,与集中式决策相比Stackelberg博弈情形下的系统效益非最优.然后利用收入一费用共享契约进行逆向供应链的协调.通过算例验证了该契约的有效性,并对回收敏感系数进行了灵敏度分析.

关 键 词:逆向供应链  协调  再制造  收入一费用共享契约

Pricing and coordination for the reverse supply chain with random collection quantity and capacity constraints
SUN Hao,DA Qing-li.Pricing and coordination for the reverse supply chain with random collection quantity and capacity constraints[J].Journal of Systems Engineering,2008,23(6).
Authors:SUN Hao  DA Qing-li
Institution:School of Economics and Management;Southeast University;Naniing 211189;China
Abstract:Considering comprehensively that collection quantity is random linear function of collec- tion price and the facility capacity of collector or manufacturer is limited,and for the two cases that the collector or the manufacturer rents a facility,the optimal collection price of the collector,the op- timal buy-back price of the manufacturer and the optimal facility capacity are analyzed under Stack- elberg game and centralized decision in the reverse supply chain.The research shows that the system benefit unde...
Keywords:reverse supply chain  coordination  remanufacturing  revenue and expense sharing contract  
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