| 核心型供应链企业协调的激励合同设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 林英晖,屠梅曾. 核心型供应链企业协调的激励合同设计[J]. 上海交通大学学报, 2005, 39(10): 1656-1659 |
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| 作者姓名： | 林英晖 屠梅曾 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学,安泰管理学院,上海,200052;上海交通大学,安泰管理学院,上海,200052 |
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| 摘 要： | 在委托-代理理论的基础上，从供应链核心企业的角度出发，针对不同类型的合作企业建立了激励合同设计的博弈模型，力求为供应链企业间的协调管理问题提供理论依据．模型的分析表明，从供应链企业间合作与协调的角度考虑，提供不同合同的设计要优于提供统一合同的设计．
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链 核心型供应链 企业协调 合同设计 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-2467(2005)10-1656-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-09-24 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-09-24 |
Incentive Contract Design for the Firms' Coordination in Supply Chains with Core Enterprise |
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| LIN Ying-hui,TU Mei-zeng. Incentive Contract Design for the Firms' Coordination in Supply Chains with Core Enterprise[J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University, 2005, 39(10): 1656-1659 |
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| Authors: | LIN Ying-hui TU Mei-zeng |
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| Affiliation: | Antai School of Management, Shanghai Jiaotong Univ. , Shanghai 200052, China |
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| Abstract: | Based on the principle-agent theory and from the perspective of the core enterprise, this paper set up a game model for the incentive contract design. It is hoped to provide a theoretical basis for the coordination among the firms in supply chains. The model shows that in order to make the supply chain coordination effective, the core enterprise should provide different contract instead of the same contract. |
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| Keywords: | supply chain supply chain with core enterprise firm coordination contract design |
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