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基于信号博弈的上市公司控制权转移分析
引用本文:肖斌,姚亚伟,杨朝军.基于信号博弈的上市公司控制权转移分析[J].上海交通大学学报,2008,42(9).
作者姓名:肖斌  姚亚伟  杨朝军
作者单位:上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海,200052
摘    要:利用信号博弈模型,探讨了我国上市公司控制权转移中股权转让方和受让方的博弈行为.结果表明:在满足一定条件下,无论股权转让方是高质量公司还是低质量公司,均存在同时发出高质量公司信号、低质量公司信号两种共同策略均衡.这对于解释股权转让过程中包装公司质量和国有资产流失问题提供了途径.

关 键 词:上市公司  控制权  控制权转移  信号博弈模型

Analysis on Control Right Transfer of Listed Companies Based on Signaling Game Model
XIAO Bin,YAO Ya-wei,YANG Chao-jun.Analysis on Control Right Transfer of Listed Companies Based on Signaling Game Model[J].Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University,2008,42(9).
Authors:XIAO Bin  YAO Ya-wei  YANG Chao-jun
Abstract:This paper used the signaling game model to explore the behavior of transferring and receiving parties in the transfer of control right of China's listed companies.The results show that under certain conditions,whether the transferring party is high or low quality company,all exist the strategy equilibrium that the company would send high or low signals together.This will help to explain the phenomenon in the equity transfer such as enhancing the quality of companies and the lost of state-owned assets.
Keywords:listed company  control right  control right transfer  signaling game model
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