The roots of predictivism |
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| Authors: | Eric Christian Barnes |
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| Affiliation: | Department of Philosophy, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275, USA;Philosophy Program, School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, United States;University of Konstanz, Department of Philosophy, Postfach 9, 78457 Konstanz, Germany;University of Vienna, Austria;Academy of Finland Centre of Excellence in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, Finland;School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3010, Australia;University of Groningen, c/o Platanenlaan 15, 2061 TP Bloemendaal, Netherlands |
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| Abstract: | In The Paradox of Predictivism (2008, Cambridge University Press) I tried to demonstrate that there is an intimate relationship between predictivism (the thesis that novel predictions sometimes carry more weight than accommodations) and epistemic pluralism (the thesis that one important form of evidence in science is the judgments of other scientists). Here I respond to various published criticisms of some of the key points from Paradox from David Harker, Jarret Leplin, and Clark Glymour. Foci include my account of predictive novelty (endorsement novelty), the claim that predictivism has two roots, the prediction per se and predictive success, and my account of why Mendeleev’s predictions carried special weight in confirming the Periodic Law of the Elements. |
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| Keywords: | Predictivism Novel confirmation Prediction Accommodation Mendeleev Periodic Law of the Elements |
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