政府监管下冷链物流资源投入的演化博弈研究

针对频繁出现的食品和药品安全问题以及冷链物流资源投入的外部正效应问题,建立政府监管下供应商与加工商物流资源投入的演化博弈模型并进行求解分析.结果显示:供应商与加工商的物流资源投入策略选择与各自投入所带来的收益密切相关,当双方物流资源投入产出不断变化时,可以得到多种演化稳定策略;如果“搭便车”行为从对方资源投入带来的收益很大,会大大降低供应商或加工商进行冷链物流资源投入的积极性;当政府的惩罚或补贴力度大于相应临界值,供应商和加工商的演化稳定策略是投入冷链物流资源.

An Evolutionary Game Study on Cold Chain Logistics Resource Allocation under Government Supervision

In view of the frequent food and drug safety problems in the cold chain,and the positive externalitiesof logistics resources investment in the cold chain,this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of logistics resources investment by suppliers and processors under the government super vision to analyze the investment decisions.The results show that the investment strategies of suppliers and processors are closely associated with the input-output ratio.When the input-output ratio changes,various evolutionary stable equilibrium solutions arise.If "free-rider" behavior can gain great benefit from the other side,the suppliers or processors are not willing to invest logistics resources in the cold chain.When the punishment or subsidy from government exceeds the corresponding critical value,the suppliers or processors will adopt the evolutionary stable strategy to invest logistics resources in the cold chain.