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政府-房地产开发商在节能建筑利益上的博弈分析
引用本文:涂劲松,戈海玉. 政府-房地产开发商在节能建筑利益上的博弈分析[J]. 皖西学院学报, 2009, 25(2): 113-115
作者姓名:涂劲松  戈海玉
作者单位:皖西学院城市建设与环境系,安徽六安,237012
基金项目:六安市定向委托皖西学院市级研究项目 
摘    要:政府和开发商是不同的利益主体,在经济的发展当中它们是一对矛盾体,就政府如何推进节能建筑问题,引入了动态激励模型,给出了政府在管制和不管制的状态下的收益期望函数,政府可依据"节能建筑行为选择的概率"确定最优选择是管制或不管制。从而有效利用激励机制和非激励机制的作用,推进开发商建设节能建筑。

关 键 词:政府  开发商  激励机制  动态博弈模型

Government-Real Estate Developers in the Interests of Energy-saving Buildings Game Analysis
TU Jin-song,GE Hai-yu. Government-Real Estate Developers in the Interests of Energy-saving Buildings Game Analysis[J]. Journal of Wanxi University, 2009, 25(2): 113-115
Authors:TU Jin-song  GE Hai-yu
Affiliation:(Department of Urban Construction and Environment ,West Anhui Uuniversity ,Lu' an 237012, China)
Abstract:Government and the developers are different subjects of interest,in the economic development which is a contradiction of their body, this article on how the Government will promote the introduction of energy-saving building dynamic incentive model, given the Government's control and not under the control of the proceeds of the expectations function, the Government may in accordance with "energy-saving buildings to choose the probability of conduct" to determine the best option is to control or not control. Thus the effective use of incentive mechanisms and the role of non-incentive mechanism to promote energy-saving building construction developers.
Keywords:government  real estate developers  incentive mechanism  dynamic game model
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