| 国有企业经营者行为监督机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 邓英杰,李建华.国有企业经营者行为监督机制研究[J].系统工程,2006,24(9):58-60. |
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| 作者姓名： | 邓英杰 李建华 |
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| 作者单位： | 中南大学,湖南,长沙,410083 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对国有企业治理中，由于信息不对称所导致的董事会与经营者效用目标不一致的情况，围绕实现收益最大化或总代理成本最小化，通过建立模型进行了分析。并对建立国有企业委托代理双向制衡机制作了探讨。
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| 关 键 词： | 公司治理 行为监督机制 委托代理双向制衡机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-4098（2006）09-0058-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-04-22 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-04-22 |
A Study on Behavior Surveillance Mechanism of the State-owned Enterprise Operators |
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| DENG Ying-jie,LI Jian-hua.A Study on Behavior Surveillance Mechanism of the State-owned Enterprise Operators[J].Systems Engineering,2006,24(9):58-60. |
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| Authors: | DENG Ying-jie LI Jian-hua |
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| Institution: | Central South University,Changsha 410083 ,China |
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| Abstract: | This paper analyzes around realizing maximum profit or minimum general agent cost by modeling and probes into establishing the principal-agent bidirectional balance mechanism of the state-owned enterprise as well in view of such situation that effectiveness goal of board of directors is not in accordance with operator owing to information asymmetry in the process of running state-owned enterprise. |
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| Keywords: | Corporate Governance Behavior Surveillance Mechanism The Principal-agent Bidirectional Balance Mechanism |
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