两种电价机制下的发电企业投资阀值比较

随着电力行业逐渐放松规制．保证充足的发电容量以满足未来的需求已成为电力市场设计的主要问题，而不同的市场机制对容量投资有着不同的激励效果。其中两部制电价相比于单一制电价更能刺激投资的观点已被普遍接受，而争议的焦点在于两部制电价是否套导致投资过剩，因此规制决定的容量报酬对容量投资在数量上会造成多大的激励作用是一个值得研究的问题。本文利用实物期权方法，对两种机制下发电企业的投资阀值进行分析比较，并建立了相应的数学模型，得出了容量报酬对投资阀值影响的数量解。模型解表明，容量报酬降低了投资阀值。但同时起作用的还有市场环境的影响。本文最后利用一个算例进一步分析了投资阀值，容量报酬及市场环境之间的关系。

The Comparison of The Value of Investment Triggers between Capacity Payment and Energy Only

The generating capacity adequacy is the main problem in the deregulation of the electricity industy when designing the the market mechanism.Different mechanisms have different performance in stimulating capacity investment.The opinion that Capacity payment has more incentives than Energy only has been accepted widely.The disagreement is that whether the Capacity payment would incur over-investment.So how much capacity investment can Capacity payment influence is a problem worth of studying.This paper put a model for the generating investors' action in the basis of Real Option(Approach.) The solution of the model turned out that Capacity payment decrease the investment triggers as well as the(market) environment.The last part of the paper analyses the relationship of investment trigger, market environment and(capacity) payment.