考虑促销努力的供应链产能策略及其协调

针对上游制造商具有多种产能策略、下游零售商开展促销活动的两层供应链系统，利用Stackelberg博弈方法，比较分析了不同产能策略下的企业决策及利润。针对可扩张的产能策略，设计了由批发价和转移支付组成的两部定价契约实现了供应链的协调。结果表明：当初始产能水平低于某一阈值时，进行产能扩张是制造商的占优策略，且可以同时提高制造商和零售商的利润；如果产能扩张成本系数较低，零售商改善促销效率的>行为对其自身有利，反之则不利，但始终对制造商有利；在可扩张的产能策略下，两部定价契约可以协调供应链，但应根据初始产能水平状态而调整契约参数。

Supply Chain Capacity Strategy and Coordination with Promotion Effort

In a two-level supply chain in which the manufacturer has multiple capacity strategies and the retailer performs promotional activities, this paper uses the Stackelberg game method to compare and analyze the decisions and profits of the two firms in different capacity strategies. In the strategy of capacity expansion, this paper coordinates the supply chain by designing a two-part tariff contract. The results show that, first, when the initial capacity level is below a certain threshold, capacity expansion is a dominant strategy for the manufacturer and can improve the profits of both firms. Then, whether efforts to improve the promotion efficiency benefit the retailer depends on the cost coefficient of capacity expansion. Nevertheless, it is always beneficial for the manufacturer. Finally, the designed contract can coordinate the supply chain with capacity expansion, but the contract items should be adjusted according to the initial capacity level.