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平台自营业务与第三方商家的劝说性广告竞争策略
引用本文:张华,李莉,何向,朱星圳,胡娇,杨文胜.平台自营业务与第三方商家的劝说性广告竞争策略[J].系统管理学报,2022,31(4):646-658.
作者姓名:张华  李莉  何向  朱星圳  胡娇  杨文胜
作者单位:南京理工大学经济管理学院,南京 210094
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771122,71972101)
摘    要:针对综合型平台自营业务和第三方商家之间的销售竞争,考虑双方进行劝说性广告投放,构建了平台自营和第三方商家在不同市场地位情况下的博弈模型,分别给出了平台自营主导,第三方商家主导以及市场地位相同时的最优决策和均衡利润,并分析了横向差异化、纵向差异化和广告服务费系数对最优决策和均衡利润的影响。研究表明:横向差异化(消费者偏好强度)越大,在平台主导和第三方商家主导的两种情况下,平台价格和广告投放水平越高;第三方商家广告投放水平降低,价格先降低后增加;双方市场地位相同情况下,平台和第三方商家的均衡价格和广告投放水平相等,并且双方的价格随消费者偏好强度增加而增加,广告投放水平与消费者偏好强度无关。纵向差异化(平台相对于第三方商家的质量差异)越大,无论市场地位情况如何,平台(第三方商家)均衡价格和广告投放水平越高(越低)。广告服务费系数并不是越高越好,只有当第三方商家主导市场且广告服务费系数达到一定水平之后,此时广告服务费系数增加才能增加平台利润。

关 键 词:综合性平台  劝说性广告  定价  横向差异化  纵向差异化  
收稿时间:2021-01-12
修稿时间:2022-03-16

Persuasive Advertising Competition Between Platform Self-Operated Seller and Third-Party Seller
ZHANG Hua,LI Li,HE Xiang,ZHU Xingzhen,HU Jiao,YANG Wensheng.Persuasive Advertising Competition Between Platform Self-Operated Seller and Third-Party Seller[J].Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications,2022,31(4):646-658.
Authors:ZHANG Hua  LI Li  HE Xiang  ZHU Xingzhen  HU Jiao  YANG Wensheng
Institution:School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094, China
Abstract:In view of the competition between self-operated seller and third-party seller on platform, this paper models persuasive advertising competition between self-operated seller and third-party seller, considering three scenarios: platform domination, third-party seller domination, and both parties have the same market position. The effects of horizontal differentiation, vertical differentiation, and advertising cost coefficient on optimal decision and profit are analyzed. The result shows that when the horizontal differentiation (the strength of consumer preference) increases, the platform price and advertising level increases, the advertising level of the third-party seller decreases, and the price decreases first and then increases. When both parties have the same market position, their price and advertising levels are equal, the price of both parties increases with the strength of consumer preference increasing, and the advertising level is independent on the strength of consumer preference. In addition, the platform (the third-party seller) price and advertising increase (decrease) with the vertical differentiation (the quality difference between the platform and the third-party seller) increasing, regardless of the market position. Moreover, the coefficient of advertising cost is not the higher the better. The profit of platform will increase with the coefficient of advertising cost only when the third-party seller dominates the market and the coefficient of advertising cost coefficient is sufficiently high.
Keywords:hybrid platform  persuasive advertising  pricing  horizontal differentiation  vertical differentiation  
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