不同审计选聘模式下财务舞弊行为演化的比较分析

管理者选聘和报告使用者选聘是常见的两种注册会计师选聘模式．选聘模式不同，则上市公司管理者与注册会计师的行为演化呈不同特征．文章通过建立非对称演化博弈模型，比较分析了两种模式下上述博弈主体行为选择的演变特征及趋势．结果表明：当采取舞弊策略的管理者在独立和不独立审计条件下的平均额外收益均为负时，两种模式对应的博弈主体行为选择会趋同，反之则有差异．另外，从演化趋势看，管理者选聘模式下出现的“合谋舞弊”现象，在报告使用者选聘模式下不会出现．

A Comparative Analysis of the Behavior Evolution of Financial Fraud under Different Audit Selection Modes

The manager selection and shareholder selection are two kinds of CPA selection mode in common.For the different selection modes, the behavior evolution of listed company＇s managers and CPAs showed the different characteristics. By establishing the asymmetric evolutionary game model, we compared and analyzed the evolution and trend of the behavior choice of the above game players under different selection modes. We obtained the following results： for anyone strategy of CPA, if the average extra income of manager with the fraud strategy is negative, the behavior choices of the corresponding game players under two selection modes have the same trend, otherwise there exists a difference. In addition, from the evolutionary trend, ＂collusion＂ phenomenon will appear in the manager selection mode, but not in the shareholder selection mode.