协同治理背景下环保信用监管的三方演化博弈分析

协同治理背景下的环保信用监管既是社会信用体系建设的重要组成,也是国家治理体系与治理能力现代化的重要内容之一;本文在梳理已有研究的基础上,通过构建企业主体、公众主体与监管主体三方参与的环保信用监管演化博弈模型,系统分析了协同治理背景下三方主体的策略选择过程;在此基础上通过仿真建模方法从微观层面研究了不同政策的监管效果,并对三方主体的策略选择过程引入了基于有限理性的随机干扰项,以进一步契合现实世界中策略选择过程的复杂性.研究结果表明,只有环保守信激励强化与履约成本降低协同推进,环保失信处罚与监管主体不监管处罚齐抓共管,才能产生良好的环保信用监管效果;对环保信用监管政策的系统性与协同性的管理是提升政策效果的必要条件.

Tripartite evolutionary game analysis for environmental credit supervision under the background of collaborative governance

Environmental credit supervision under the background of cooperative governance is not only an important component of the construction of social credit system,but also one of the important contents of the modernization of national governance system and governance capabilities.This paper analyses tripartite main bodies under the background of cooperative governance by constructing an evolutionary game model involving enterprises,public and regulatory bodies.On this basis,this paper studies the regulatory effects of different policies from the micro level by methods of simulation modeling.The results show that good environmental credit supervision effect can be achieved only when the incentives of keeping promise are strengthened and the costs of performance are reduced,and the penalties of dishonesty and non-supervision are jointly managed.Systematic and synergistic management of credit regulatory policies is a necessary condition to improve the effectiveness of policies.