政府补贴对京津冀雾霾防控策略的区间博弈分析

本文利用模糊数学理论和合作博弈论,分别从民众、企业以及政府的角度综合考虑治理雾霾需要的直接治理成本、经济发展成本、社会稳定成本以及社会健康成本,建立京津冀雾霾非合作治理模型以及区间合作治理博弈模型,分别计算了京津冀在非合作与合作情况下雾霾的治理成本、不治理成本以及治理策略,并考虑政府补贴对京津冀治理策略的影响,利用区间Slhapley值对最小的政府补贴进行分配.结论表明:没有政府补贴,京津冀三地均无法负担雾霾治理成本;相对于非合作治理模式,合作治理雾霾时政府所需的补贴最少.

Interval game analysis of government subsidies on haze governance in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei

Based on the theory of fuzzy mathematics and cooperative game, this paper measures haze costs thoroughly from social health costs of people, direct control cost and opportunity costs of enterprises, social stability costs of government. Firstly we present haze prevention and control strategy model using interval cooperative game over Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei. Then haze costs for governing or not in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei are calculated separately by non-cooperation and cooperation game. Finally we also analyze the haze governance strategy influenced by government subsidy in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, and allocate minimum government subsidy among them. The conclusion shows that Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei are unable to bear the cost of governance haze without government subsidies; and the required government subsidies is minimum while the grand coalition works.