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招投标流程的优化设计
引用本文:周亚,吴斌,李克强. 招投标流程的优化设计[J]. 北京师范大学学报(自然科学版), 2008, 44(1): 106-110
作者姓名:周亚  吴斌  李克强
作者单位:北京师范大学管理学院,100875,北京
基金项目:北京市教育科学规划项目
摘    要:通过收集北京市的招投标数据,进行了实证分析,对北京市国有投资工程的中标现状,尤其是最低价中标的现状及其相关因素进行了研究.结论表明,目前,由于采用了综合评分(而非真正的综合评价)方法,北京市国有投资工程中,仅有不到30%的最低价中标;在各投标方产品或工程质量无大差异的前提下,这导致了10%左右的价格损失;是否最低价中标与工程的价值有相关性,与工程类型没有相关性.为此,应综合考虑最低价中标和综合评价中标,进一步改进招投标的流程,以减少寻租空间,有效遏制腐败,提出了"两个步骤"的流程优化建议.

关 键 词:国有投资工程  委托代理关系  招投标  流程
收稿时间:2007-08-21
修稿时间:2007-08-21

STUDY ON THE REDESIGN OF THE BIDDING PROCESS
Zhou Ya,Wu Bin,Li Keqiang. STUDY ON THE REDESIGN OF THE BIDDING PROCESS[J]. Journal of Beijing Normal University(Natural Science), 2008, 44(1): 106-110
Authors:Zhou Ya  Wu Bin  Li Keqiang
Abstract:Due to the existence of rent seeking behavior in the market economy, corruption in the government procurement has been the focus for long. Empirical analysis of the current tender and bidding data in Beijing provides detailed account of those who have won the bidding, especially those who won by bidding the lowest price. It is found that only less than 30%0 of the winning bids are bottom prices, which yields a 10% loss to the public finance sector. This paper also gives a possible solution to the problem based on a redesign of the bidding process.
Keywords:state-funded construction projects   the principal-agent model   tender and bidding   process
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