大股东股权质押、控制权转移风险与公司业绩

大量有关大股东对上市公司业绩影响的研究多以委托代理理论为框架, 且大多显示"利益输送"等负面结论, 中国公司的研究结论也大体如此. 事实上, 在中国, 大股东作为独立法人大多具有其自身经营与财务行为(如近期普遍流行的大股东股权质押融资), 这些行为将有可能对上市公司业绩产生深远影响, 尽管其影响机理及影响结果尚无定论. 结合大股东性质、融资约束等中国制度背景因素, 本文研究了大股东股权质押融资行为与上市公司业绩改善间的关系. 研究表明: (1)与国有大股东相比, 民营大股东因融资约束等原因而大量采用股权质押融资策略; (2)股权质押行为与大股东持股比率之间存在某种关联性, 相对于国有大股东, 民营大股东因融资约束及质押融资更强的"对赌"意愿, 其质押行为与持股比率之间呈显著负相关关系; (3)与国有大股东不同, 民营大股东在质押股权后因担心控制权转移风险, 从而有更强激励来改善公司经营及业绩. 这也表明, 单纯从股权质押融资这一视角, 大股东(尤其是民营大股东)的财务行为可能日趋理性, 其存在并非一味为了"利益掏空".

Stock rights pledging of the blockholders, controlling rights transferring risk and firm's performance

Researches on effects of blockholders to firm's performance are mostly conceptually based on principal-agency model, and the results are likely to be negative, e.g. tunneling. Plentiful researches in China show the similar answers. In fact, as an independent legal entities, the blockholders of public-listed companies of China have frequently done their own businesses and incurred their own financing activities, for instance stock rights pledging (SRP) financing which popularized in currently years. These financing activities therefore would have deeply impacts on the companies' performance, albeit what and how of the impacts remain unanswered. Based on the nature of blockholders and the contextual financing constraints in China, this paper empirically exploits causality of blockholders' SRPs on companies' performance improvement. Our research shows: (1) comparing to state-owned blockholders, non-state-owned blockholders which are seriously encountered financing constraints, have therefore taken much more SRP as their financing strategies; (2) to blockholders, there exists relationship between SRPs and their equity-holdings at large. Further investigations show that, comparing to state-owned blockholders, this relationship to the non-state-owned blockholders, who have to take risks in financing which could be reluctantly forced by financing constraints is empirically negative; (3) underlying the controlling rights transferring risks which would be concomitantly encountered by blockholders, SRP of the no-state-owned blockholders do motivate themselves to improve, not deteriorate firm's performance, although the same effect does not find on state-owned blockholders. Merely from the perspective of SRP, this result also demonstrates that behaviors of blockholders (at least on non-state-owned) are incline to be rational, letting their existences are not purely to play tunneling.