用户异质下公交定价和道路收费收入再分配

针对收费道路与公共交通并行的竞争交通系统,在异质用户的出行时间价值服从均匀分布的假设下,结合公共交通的边际成本定价和平均成本定价策略,建立了均衡交通模型,分析了出行者的出行行为.研究发现,随着出行者时间价值之间的差异增大,无论收费收入上交财政还是补贴公交,自驾车人数在不同定价策略下差距减小.进一步,基于效率和公平的准则,考察了道路拥挤收费收入再分配原则所导致的系统总出行成本的变化情况,对四种公交定价和道路收费收入再分配策略进行了对比分析.研究表明,当道路收费收入直接补贴给公交出行者时,比较系统的总出行成本,平均成本定价策略优于边际成本定价.从公平角度分析,当出行用户的时间价值差异不是很大时,无论公交采取边际还是平均成本定价策略,收费收入全部用于补贴公交用户会使得公平性提高.最后,算例结果验证了当固定成本足够大时,受补贴的公交平均成本定价策略是一种较优的策略.

Transit pricing and redistribution of toll revenue with user heterogeneity

Considering user heterogeneity with different values of time (VOTs), traffic equilibrium models are presented to investigate commutes' travel behavior in a bi-modal transportation system with a mass transit parallel to a toll road. The VOTs of individuals are assumed to follow the continuous uniform distribution, and two types of transit fare are discussed when it is equal to the marginal cost or the average cost. Relative change of modal split after transit subsidy from toll revenue is also examined. The results show that with the increase of the standard deviation of VOT, the differences of highway traffic flow with or without transit subsidy will decrease. Furthermore, the total social costs are compared under four different pricing strategies based on efficiency and equity. The results show that the average cost pricing strategy is superior to the marginal cost pricing at the total social cost after toll revenue redistribution. It is also found that, equity will increase as the standard deviation of VOT decreases, if toll revenue is used to subsidy public transportation. Finally, numerical results are used to verify transit average cost with subsidy is a better strategy when the fixed cost is large enough.