不同博弈类型对门槛公共品供给结果的影响

门槛公共品作为一种特殊的公共品,除了拥有一般公共品的非排他性和非竞争性之外,还具有一个特殊的性质:它的提供要求人们对该公共品的贡献之和必须大于一个临界值,即门槛.反之,如果人们的贡献之和小于门槛,该公共品就不能被提供出来.本文通过建立模型,从理论上分析了两个同质参与者在贡献不可退还的规则下,不同博弈类型(同时博弈、序贯博弈)对门槛公共品供给的影响,然后进一步分析其对社会福利、社会公平以及公共品提供成功率的影响.结果发现,同时博弈相比于序贯博弈可以达到更高的社会福利水平,而且参与者之间也更加公平.序贯博弈相比于同时博弈可以保证门槛公共品以更高的概率被提供出来.

The effects of game types on the provision of threshold public goods

As a special kind of public goods, threshold public goods have a unique feature besides the non-excludability and non-competitive shared by other public goods, i.e., it can be provided only if the aggregate supply exceeds a critical level, which we call threshold, and vice versa. This paper sets up a model to analyze the effects of the order of moves (simultaneous vs. sequential) on the provision of threshold public goods theoretically. I compare effects of simultaneous game and sequential game on social welfare, fairness and success rate. The conclusion is that there are higher level of social welfare and fairness but low success rate in simultaneous game than that in sequential game.