| 不对称信息下基于委托代理模型的地沟油监管政策研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 吴军,毕研林,李健,袁文燕. 不对称信息下基于委托代理模型的地沟油监管政策研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2016, 36(10): 2610-2617. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2016)10-2610-08 |
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| 作者姓名： | 吴军 毕研林 李健 袁文燕 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 北京化工大学 经济管理学院, 北京 100029;2. 北京化工大学 理学院, 北京 100029 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金（71171011,71571010,71372195）;北京化工大学学科建设项目基金（XK1522） |
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| 摘 要： | 地沟油流向监管是我国食品安全领域的热点问题.本文从政府监管角度,运用委托代理理论研究了信息不对称下政府对地沟油流向监管的问题,考虑了激励机制和惩罚机制,给出了最优合同设计,防止地沟油进入非法利益链条回流餐桌,同时促使地沟油流向生物质能源链条变废为宝.论文的研究结果为政府在地沟油监管政策制定方面提供一定的参考.
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| 关 键 词： | 地沟油 委托代理理论 不对称信息 监管政策 |
| 收稿时间： | 2015-11-16 |
Regulatory policy for gutter oil based on principal-agent model under asymmetric information |
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| WU Jun,BI Yanlin,LI Jian,YUAN Wenyan. Regulatory policy for gutter oil based on principal-agent model under asymmetric information[J]. Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice, 2016, 36(10): 2610-2617. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2016)10-2610-08 |
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| Authors: | WU Jun BI Yanlin LI Jian YUAN Wenyan |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Beijing 100029, China;2. School of Science, Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Beijing 100029, China |
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| Abstract: | Gutter oil becomes one of hot topics of food safety in China. Gutter oil is bad for health, but it can be used as raw material for biomass energy. In this paper, we study the regulatory policy for gutter oil by using principal-agent model. Both the incentive mechanism and punishment mechanism are proposed. The results provides good insights for regulatory policy on gutter oil disposal management. |
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| Keywords: | gutter oil principal-agent theory asymmetric information regulatory policy |
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