风险投资中激励契约设计与学习机制研究

控制权转移激励是委托代理激励契约的重要元素,但目前对动态学习机制下委托代理激励契约机制设计还缺乏深入研究.本文在现有研究基础上,考虑到风险项目收益风险与职业经理人道德风险之间交互作用,融合控制权转移激励和职业经理人风险规避行为,建立了包含资本和风险规避型职业经理人劳动投入的委托代理激励契约的两阶段优化与学习模型,探究风险投资者的学习机制及其影响因素,挖掘控制权转移激励、风险规避型职业经理人道德风险行为及项目收益风险之间的相互影响机制.研究发现了风险投资者学习效应下控制权转移激励与项目收益风险正相关关系和规模报酬效应.此外,通过计算实验也发现了在职消费及风险项目战略收益对风险规避型职业经理人劳动效用具有显著的增强效应,而风险项目战略收益仅对风险投资者投资收益具有显著的增强效应.将控制权转移激励、风险规避型职业经理人道德风险及项目收益风险融合到风险投资委托代理契约设计中具有较强的理论价值,同时对风险投资者和职业经理人来说都有一定的借鉴和参考意义.

Research on incentives contract design and learning mechanism in risk investment

The incentives of control right transfer is an important element of the principal-agent incentives contracts, but the principal-agent incentives contract mechanism design under the dynamic learning mechanism still lack of in-depth study. Thus based on existing research, this paper considered the interaction between the project income risk and the professional managers' moral hazard, and integrated with the control right transfer incentives and the risk-averse behavior of professional managers. And based on those, this paper established the two-stage optimization and learning model of the principal-agent incentives contract including capital and labor input of professional managers of risk-aversion, and explored the learning mechanism and influential factors of venture investors, and found the interaction mechanism among the control right transfer incentives, the risk-averse professional managers' moral hazard behavior and the project income risk. The study found that the positive correlation between control right transfer incentives and project risk, and the scale compensation effect under the learning effects of risk investors. In addition, the study also found the significant enhanced effect of on-the-job consumption and the strategic benefits of risk project on the labor utility of professional managers of risk aversion through calculating the experiment, but the significant enhancement effect of the strategic benefits of risk project on the investment income of venture investors is sole. Integrating the control right transfer incentives, the risk-averse professional managers' moral risk and project income risk into the design of risk investment principal-agent contract has stronger theory value, also have a certain reference significance for venture investors and professional managers.