公共停车场与私营停车场的博弈定价模型

本文研究公共停车场和私营停车场之间的定价博弈问题.考虑早高峰出行模式,出行者可以选择小汽车或者轨道交通出行.小汽车出行用户在到达目的时,需考虑停车问题(选用公共停车场或私营停车场).本文首先采用交通流的瓶颈模型分析出行模式与两类停车场定价、各自停车位数量的关系.在此基础上,建立了政府决策者(公共停车场)与私人效益最大化追求者(私营停车场)参与的NASH博弈模型,探讨NASH平衡条件下的两类停车场的最优收费模式.同时,比较了两类停车场共存的博弈竞价机制与单一私营停车场供应的社会效益.研究结果表明,以最小化社会总成本为目标,政府决策者是否实施停车补贴,将取决于公用停车场停车位数量.政府决策者可以通过调整公共停车位的数量和收费水平,使得交通系统性能趋于系统最优.

A game-theoretical model of the parking pricing for a transportation network with public and private parking infrastructures

In this paper, we study a parking pricing problem of a game between public and private parking infrastructures. In the morning commuting peak hour, commuters could fulfill their trip journeys via taking rail transits or driving private cars. For the case of driving private car, a driver needs to make a decision on choosing a parking facility (either public or private parking infrastructure) when she arrives at the destination (i.e., CBD). In this study, we firstly analyze morning commuting traffic patterns, and explore the relationships between the patterns and attributes of two kinds of parking infrastructures (i.e, their parking fees and parking spot provisions). Based on the derived traffic patterns, we develop a two-player Nash game model for the parking pricing problem, in which the government who controls the public parking infrastructure aims to maximize the social welfare (also called minimizing the total social cost), and the private operator who manages the private parking infrastructure attempts to maximize her profit. At the Nash game equilibrium, we have obtained the optimal parking pricing levels of two players. Meanwhile, we make a comprehensive comparison between the case with two parking facilities and the case only with private parking infrastructure. Through numerical experiments, it was demonstrated that:i) whether the government should take a parking charge or make a subsidy greatly depends on the parking spot provision of the public parking facility; and 2) the government could improve the transportation system's performance (even make an optimal system) by optimizing the parking spot provision and parking pricing level of the public parking facility.