| 统一价格竞价机制下发电商报价策略研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 东明,郭亚军,郭宏. 统一价格竞价机制下发电商报价策略研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2004, 24(4): 83-87. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2004)4-83 |
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| 作者姓名： | 东明 郭亚军 郭宏 |
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| 作者单位： | 东北大学工商管理学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 辽宁省科技厅项目(2002401017) |
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| 摘 要： | 在统一价格竞价机制下,考虑到电力需求弹性,建立了完全信息静态博弈模型,求解得到了发电商的最优报价策略.通过分析,指出了发电商报价行为的特点以及统一价格竞争机制所存的缺陷,证明了该机制不是成功的竞价机制.
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| 关 键 词： | 电力市场 报价 博弈 统一价格竞价机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-6788(2004)04-0083-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003-04-26 |
Research on Generating Entities'''' Bidding Strategies in Uniform Price Auction Rule |
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| DONG Ming,GUO Ya-jun,GUO Hong. Research on Generating Entities'''' Bidding Strategies in Uniform Price Auction Rule[J]. Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice, 2004, 24(4): 83-87. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2004)4-83 |
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| Authors: | DONG Ming GUO Ya-jun GUO Hong |
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| Affiliation: | Faculty of Business Administration, Northeastern University |
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| Abstract: | Based on the demand elasticity of electricity, this paper presents a game model with complete information under the uniform price auction rule and acquires the optimal bidding strategy of the generating entities. The characteristic of the bidding strategy and the defect of this rule are pointed out. It is proved that the uniform price auction rule is not good. |
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| Keywords: | electricity market bidding game uniform price auction rule |
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