| 基于声誉效应的人才中介机构约束机制 |
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| 引用本文： | 李杰,黄培清.基于声誉效应的人才中介机构约束机制[J].上海交通大学学报,2007,41(7):1158-1160,1164. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李杰 黄培清 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学,安泰经济与管理学院,上海,200052 |
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| 摘 要： | 当雇主企业把招聘业务外包给人才中介机构时,两者间由于信息不对称产生道德风险问题.文中把人才中介机构声誉这一要素引入其效用函数,通过建立相应的模型探讨了信息不对称情况下中介机构的报酬契约.研究表明,在某种程度上,声誉效应能很好地解决该道德风险问题.
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| 关 键 词： | 人才中介机构 道德风险 声誉效应 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-2467（2007）07-1158-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-09-15 |
The Constraint Mechanism of Talent Agency Based on Reputation Effect |
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| LI Jie,HUANG Pei-qing.The Constraint Mechanism of Talent Agency Based on Reputation Effect[J].Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University,2007,41(7):1158-1160,1164. |
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| Authors: | LI Jie HUANG Pei-qing |
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| Abstract: | Moral hazard will be derived from asymmetric information between employer and talent agency when recruitment is outsourcing.This paper introduced the agency reputation to its utility function,and discussed the agency's reward contract under asymmetric information by relative model.The research indicates the reputation effect can solve the moral hazard in some extent. |
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| Keywords: | talent agency moral hazard reputation effect |
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