意向性与知，哪个更基本？

关于“意向”的思想古已有之，近现代的“意向性”研究则由布伦塔诺所开创，他提出了第一种意向性概念：心理行为指向内存在对象（色声味等）。胡塞尔在继承和发展意向性研究中提出了第二种意向性概念：心理的感觉内容通过赋予意义而指向客观事物（可简述为心理指涉外物）。关于意向性的存在地位问题现在仍是众说纷纭而尚无定论。但有证据表明，意向性是后天形成的，是经由感知一动作协调过程结合学习联想回忆机制而形成，实为一种整体觉知效应。故意向性不能为心理的本质特性，心理的本质应是“知”（觉知），因为“知”乃是一切心理现象性命攸关的共性，有之则是，无之则否。而且，“知”也是最奥秘的心性，它不可定义，也难以用关系范畴和主客体模式来理解，只能凭借现象学方法来揭示其大义，由之证悟了“明”的境界和“我”的内在，开显了“心”的堂奥。若绕开“知”来论究心理意识将不得要领。

Intentionality and Knowing, Which of Them Is More Fundamental？

The thought of intention has existed since antiquity. The modern research of intentionality was initiated by F. Bren- tano, he put forward the first concept of intentionality： The mental behavior points to the internal object （colour, sound, taste, etc. ）. E. Husserl inherited and developed the research of intentionality, and put forward the second concept of inten- tionality： The sense content points to objective things by endowing with meaning （in brief, the mind points to external things）. The problem of existent status of intentionality, opinions still vary on that now, no final conclusion has yet reached. But there is evidence showing, the intentionality is formed in postnatal, it forms by the coordinative process of perception-act with the mechanism of study-association-recollection, this actually is a whole effect of knowing. So the intentionality cannot be the essential property of mind. The mental essence is ＂knowing＂ （awareness）, since ＂knowing＂ is the property of vital im- portance for all mental phenomena, there is ＂knowing＂ and the mind be, no ＂knowing＂ and no mind. Moreover ＂knowing＂ is also the most mystic mental property, it cannot he given a definition, and is difficult to interpret from the category of rela- tionship and the model of subject object, only relys on the method of phenomenology to reveal its meaning. From this, we un- derstand the bright state and the existence of ego and the mystery of mind. Averting ＂knowing＂, the research of mental phenomena must be inapt.