| 委托代理中的目标激励 |
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| 引用本文： | 柏培文,孟宪忠. 委托代理中的目标激励[J]. 北京工商大学学报(自然科学版), 2005, 23(6): 51-54 |
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| 作者姓名： | 柏培文 孟宪忠 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学,管理学院,上海,200000 |
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| 摘 要： | 通过建立模型分析目标激励在委托代理中的作用,可以发现:在没有风险时,物质激励与目标激励效果相同.在存在风险的情况下,目标激励比纯粹物质激励更有效率,带来更多的总剩余,并且,即使在风险较高的情况下,也能保证委托代理关系的存在;当目标激励变为奉献激励时,会导致代理人不作为行为.因此,在无风险的情况下,对代理人应采用物质激励,在有风险的情况下,应对代理人采用目标激励.
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| 关 键 词： | 目标激励 物质激励 委托代理 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-1513（2005）06-005104 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-08-22 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-08-22 |
TARGET INCENTIVE IN AGENCY |
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| BAI Pei-wen,MENG Xian-zhong. TARGET INCENTIVE IN AGENCY[J]. Journal of Beijing Technology and Business University:Natural Science Edition, 2005, 23(6): 51-54 |
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| Authors: | BAI Pei-wen MENG Xian-zhong |
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| Affiliation: | School of Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200000, China |
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| Abstract: | In this paper,it discovers the roles of target incentive in agency by model.The solutions are as follows: under no risk,material incentive has the same effects on a deputy with target incentive;in the risk,target incentive is more efficiency than material incentive in agency and comes to larger total surplus,and even if in the higher risk,target incentive can guarantee agency to continue;when target incentive is changed into dedication incentive,it makes a deputy to do nothing.So,under no risk,material incentive should be adopted to a deputy in the company;and in the risk,target incentive should be adopted in the company. |
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| Keywords: | target incentive material incentive agency |
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