Scepticism,relativism, and the structure of epistemic frameworks |
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Authors: | Steven Bland |
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Affiliation: | Huron University College, 1349 Western Road, London, Ontario N6G 1H3, Canada |
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Abstract: | This paper has four aims: first, to outline the role of the sceptical problem of the criterion in the principal argument for epistemic relativism; second, to establish that methodist and particularist responses to the problem of the criterion do not, by themselves, constitute successful strategies for resisting epistemic relativism; third, to argue that a more fruitful strategy is to attempt to evaluate epistemic frameworks on the basis of the epistemic resources that they have in common; and finally, to make the case that finding this common ground will necessarily involve determining how it is that a framework’s constituent epistemic methods depend on one another for not only their warrant, but for their application. |
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Keywords: | Epistemic relativism Scepticism Problem of the criterion Epistemic pluralism Particularism Methodism |
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