| 基于无限重复博弈的管理决策建模分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 赖水香. 基于无限重复博弈的管理决策建模分析[J]. 西南师范大学学报(自然科学版), 2012, 37(3): 128-132 |
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| 作者姓名： | 赖水香 |
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| 作者单位： | 赣南师范学院商学院,江西赣州,341000 |
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| 摘 要： | 分析了无限重复博弈成功应用的条件,并以此结论建立博弈模型,确定收益矩阵参数,该模型在实际应用中能得到合理的解释,其博弈结果是双赢的博弈平衡.
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| 关 键 词： | 重复博弈 Nash均衡 囚徒困境 建模 条件策略 |
Modeling Analysis of Management Decision Based on Infinite Repeated Game |
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| LAI Shui-xiang. Modeling Analysis of Management Decision Based on Infinite Repeated Game[J]. Journal of southwest china normal university(natural science edition), 2012, 37(3): 128-132 |
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| Authors: | LAI Shui-xiang |
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| Affiliation: | LAI Shui-xiang Business College,Gannan Normal University,Ganzhou,Jiangxi 341000,China |
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| Abstract: | In a single game,patients are prone to fall in prisoner dilemma of Nash equilibrium.In a repeated game,however,patients can choose the best strategy according to their opponent’s actions and previous game results,and have more opportunities to avoid prisoner dilemma.In this paper,the limit conditions of successfully applying infinite repeated game theory are analyzed and obtained.Based on this,income matrix parameters are confirmed and a game model is established.A rational explanation is given for applying this game model in practice.The game result of this model is a win-win balance. |
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| Keywords: | repeated game Nash equilibrium prisoner dilemma modeling trigger strategy |
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