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分裂化恐怖组织袭击策略的Moran过程随机演化模型
引用本文:武山松,刘德海,王雷.分裂化恐怖组织袭击策略的Moran过程随机演化模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,1981,40(11):2885-2896.
作者姓名:武山松  刘德海  王雷
作者单位:1. 东北财经大学 管理科学与工程学院, 大连 116025;2. 中国刑事警察学院 治安系, 沈阳 110854
基金项目:科技部国家重点研发计划"公共安全风险防控与应急技术装备"重点专项课题(2018YFC0807500);国家自然科学基金(71874024,71571033,71571035)
摘    要:国际恐怖组织出现分裂化的演变趋势及多样化的行为诱因.本文构建了分裂化恐怖组织袭击策略的Moran过程演化模型,得出了分别在经济动因、意识形态和外界随机干扰因素主导下不袭击策略达到演化稳定的条件.研究表明,恐怖组织的策略演化主要取决于成本收益因素、恐怖组织的分裂化程度和政府打击恐怖主义力度.对于以经济利益为主导动机的恐怖组织,不袭击策略成为恐怖分子的演化稳定策略需要满足一定的收益条件.对于"独狼"类型的恐怖分子,所在国政府单纯从经济利益角度进行防范无法实现有效遏制.对于以意识形态为主导动机的恐怖组织,袭击策略始终是演化稳定策略.当外界随机干扰因素占据主导地位时,小规模的恐怖组织,以及恐怖组织分裂数目增大,反而使得袭击行动更加频繁.

关 键 词:恐怖组织  随机演化博弈  Moran过程  分裂化  意识形态  
收稿时间:2020-02-18

Stochastic evolutionary model of Moran process for attacking strategies of decentralizing terrorist organizations
WU Shansong,LIU Dehai,WANG Lei.Stochastic evolutionary model of Moran process for attacking strategies of decentralizing terrorist organizations[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,1981,40(11):2885-2896.
Authors:WU Shansong  LIU Dehai  WANG Lei
Institution:1. School of Management Science and Engineering, Dongbei University of Finance&Economics, Dalian 116025, China;2. Department of Public Security, Criminal Investigation Police University of China, Shenyang 110854, China
Abstract:The international terrorist organizations have the trend of decentralization and diversified behavior incentives. In this paper, the Moran process evolution model of the attacking strategy of the decentralized terrorist organization is constructed, and the conditions for the non-attacking strategy to achieve the evolution stability under the guidance of economic motivation, ideology and external stochastic interference are obtained. Research shows that the evolution of terrorist organization strategy mainly depends on cost-benefit factors, the degree of terrorist organization decentralization and the government's efforts to combat terrorism. For a terrorist organization with economic interests as its main motive, it is necessary to meet certain revenue conditions for the strategy of non-attacking to become an evolutionary stable strategy for terrorists. For the type of "lone wolf" terrorists, the host government can not achieve effective containment only from the perspective of economic interests. For the terrorist organizations with ideology as the dominant motive, the attacking strategy is always the evolutionary stable strategy. When the external stochastic interference factors dominate, the number of small-scale terrorist organizations, as well as the number of terrorist organizations increases, but makes the attacks more frequent.
Keywords:terrorist organizations  stochastic evolutionary game  Moran process  decentralization  ideology  
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