收入共享与谈判权力对供应链碳减排决策的影响

本文以政府征收碳税且消费者偏好低碳产品为背景，在单生产商单零售商的供应链中研究了收入共享及谈判权力对生产商碳减排决策及成员收益的影响，其中收入共享比例可通过谈判制定.研究发现：若收入共享比例外生，收入共享能使生产商碳减排率增大，收益升高；而若能自由制定共享比例，生产商会选择独占所有收入，而零售商会选择适中的比例.在双边谈判下，若不减排，生产商应得的收入比例等于其谈判权力；若减排，则该比例高于其谈判权力.特别地，若零售商拥有全部谈判权力，他仍会与生产商分享收益，这对双方都有利；而若生产商拥有全部的谈判权力，她会独占全部的销售收入.并且，与不共享收入相比，生产商总是能从谈判收入共享比例中受益，然而，零售商仅在生产商谈判权力较弱时才能从中受益.再者，消费者的低碳偏好或碳税都能刺激生产商减排，且两家企业都总能从减排中获益，而政府可用适度碳税刺激企业尽可能高地减排.最后，当且仅当生产商拥有完全的谈判权力时，收入共享契约才能完美协调供应链.

The effect of revenue sharing and bargaining power on carbon emission reduction in a supply chain

Based on the background where carbon taxes arise and customers are willing to pay more for low-carbon products, we study a supply chain with a manufacturer (she) and a retailer (he) and explore the effect of revenue sharing and bargaining power on the manufacturer's carbon emission abatement efforts and the two firms' profits, where the firms can negotiate over the revenue share through the bilateral bargaining game. Our analytical results show that, with an exogenous revenue share, revenue sharing can enhance the manufacturer's incentive to abate carbon emission and her profit, and the manufacturer would like to seize all the sale revenue while the retail will take a moderate proportion when the revenue share can be determined by either firm. However, under the bilateral bargaining game, the manufacturer's deserved revenue share without abatement is equal to her bargaining power, but her share with abatement is greater than her bargaining power. In particular, even when the retailer holds all the bargaining power, he will still share his revenue with the manufacturer, which can improve both firms' profits; yet, when the manufacturer possesses all the bargaining power, she will grab all the sales revenue. Moreover, when compared with the case without revenue sharing, the manufacturer will always benefit from negotiating a revenue-sharing ratio, whereas the retailer can benefit from this only when the manufacturer enjoys limited bargaining power. Specifically, if the retailer has full bargaining power, he will still share the profits with the manufacturer, which is mutually beneficial; If the manufacturer has all the negotiating power, she will own all the sales. And the manufacturer will always benefit from negotiating a revenue-sharing ratio, compared with non-sharing, whereas the retailer will benefit only if the manufacturer has less negotiating power. What's more, either consumers' environmental awareness or the government's carbon taxes can stimulate the manufacturer to invest in carbon emission abatement, and both firms always benefit from this investment. Furthermore, the government can set an appropriate carbon tax to induce the manufacturer to choose an abatement rate as large as possible. Finally, revenue sharing contract can perfectly coordinate the supply chain only when the manufacturer possesses all the bargaining power.