P2P网络借贷市场最优结构状态与监管模式研究——基于不同监管阶段的演化博弈分析

在征信系统等基础设施欠完善的背景下，P2P网络借贷市场带来了一系列的问题，例如行业自律性差、平台跑路失联、行业风险积聚等，通过外部监管约束调节市场已成为行业发展的当务之急.本文通过研究近十年的P2P网络借贷市场的发展与监管机制，将行业监管分为监管粗放与监管密集两个阶段，并使用演化博弈模型分析监管强度如何影响企业经营行为和市场结构.同时，本文重点分析了市场结构在监管加强、行业收缩的条件下的演化过程和最优状态.研究结果表明，随着监管政策的加强，领导型企业具有维持市场优势地位的能力，追随型企业很难扩大市场份额，甚至部分平台较难达到监管标准并逐渐退出市场，市场集中度提高，市场结构从"低集中的竞争结构"转化为"以领导企业为主导、追随企业共存的寡占型市场结构"，P2P在转型为网络小贷、消金公司后的市场结构应朝这一方向努力.

Analysis on optimal market structure and supervision mode of online P2P lending: Based on evolutionary game theory in different supervision stages

Online P2P lending in China is facing a series of challenges such as poor industry self-discipline, platforms collapse frequently and industry risk accumulation. It is significant to regulate the online P2P lending market through external supervision. In this paper, online P2P lending development is divided into two periods over the last decade, loose supervision period and intensive supervision period. The evolutionary game theoretic approach is used to investigate the impact of supervision on enterprise behavior and market structure. Under the conditions of strengthened supervision and industry contraction, this paper attempts to explore the evolution and optimal structure of online P2P lending market. The research results show that leading style enterprises have competitive advantages to maintain dominant position with strengthened supervision. In contrast, satellite style enterprises are more difficult to expand market share and meet regulatory standards thus finally quit the market. With the increase of market concentration, the optimal market structure converts from low-concentrated competitive market to oligopolistic market dominated by leading style enterprises.