大股东权力对我国上市公司业绩的影响研究

本文以2003-2016年中国沪深上市公司为研究样本，采用基于合作博弈理论的Shapley权力指数测度第一大股东权力水平，考察了大股东权力对公司业绩的影响.研究发现：1）大股东权力水平对公司业绩有显著的促进作用，大股东权力水平的提高有利于公司业绩的提升；2）大股东存在"更少掏空效应"，即权力水平提升抑制了大股东掏空行为，有效提高了公司业绩；3）大股东存在"监督效应"，即权力水平升高增加了大股东监督经理人的动力，缓解了代理问题，改善了公司的经营业绩；4）进一步的研究显示，大股东权力对公司业绩的提升作用在非国有企业中更强，同时大股东权力的提高有利于市场业绩的提升、业绩风险的降低以及长期业绩的提升.本文较为全面地从大股东权力的视角展现了所有权结构对公司业绩的影响，有助于理解中国背景下所有权结构与公司业绩的真实关系.

The impact of the power of major shareholders on the listed firms' performance

By using Shapley value based on the cooperative game theory as a measure of the largest shareholder's power, this paper investigates the impact of the major shareholders' power on the company performance, which is based on the data of Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2016. The results show that: 1) the power of the major shareholders has significant positive effect on the company performance. Increasing the level of power of major shareholders is conducive to the improvement of company performance; 2) there is a "less tunneling effect" for major shareholders. The increase of power level inhibits the tunneling, and effectively improving the company performance; 3) there is a "supervisory effect" for major shareholders. Increased power levels have increased the motivation of major shareholders to oversee managers, eased agency issues, and improved the company's operating performance; 4) further research shows that the power of major shareholders to enhance company performance is stronger in non-state-owned enterprises. The increasing the power of major shareholders is conducive to improving market performance, reducing performance risks, and improving long-term performance. This paper comprehensively shows the impact of ownership structure on company performance from the perspective of the power of major shareholders, which helps to understand the true relationship between ownership structure and company performance in the context of China.