首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

考虑风险关联的轨道交通PPP项目风险分担演化博弈模型
引用本文:王军武,余旭鹏.考虑风险关联的轨道交通PPP项目风险分担演化博弈模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,1981,40(9):2391-2405.
作者姓名:王军武  余旭鹏
作者单位:武汉理工大学 土木工程与建筑学院, 武汉 430070
基金项目:国家重点研发计划项目(2018YFC0704301);武汉市城乡建设局科技计划项目(201943)
摘    要:为改善博弈论用于研究风险分担策略选择问题时忽略风险关联这一弊端,立足于演化博弈与风险关联视角,刻画应分担风险损失并引入到轨道交通PPP(public-private partnership)项目风险分担演化博弈模型中,根据复制动态方程,研究策略选择问题的演化过程,得到不同情形下的演化稳定策略.研究结果表明:风险分担系数、风险控制成本、基础收益等9个因素都会影响双方的策略选择,此外更重要的是,是否考虑风险关联可能会导致最终的演化结果有所不同.

关 键 词:风险关联  public-private  partnership  (PPP)  风险分担  演化博弈  
收稿时间:2019-09-24

Evolutionary game model of risk-sharing of rail transit PPP projects considering risk correlation
WANG Junwu,YU Xupeng.Evolutionary game model of risk-sharing of rail transit PPP projects considering risk correlation[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,1981,40(9):2391-2405.
Authors:WANG Junwu  YU Xupeng
Institution:School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
Abstract:In order to improve the disadvantage of neglecting risk correlation when using game theory to study the selection of risk-sharing strategies, this paper, based on evolutionary game and risk correlation, describes the risk loss that should be shared and introduces it into the evolutionary game model of risk-sharing for rail transit public-private partnership (PPP) projects. According to the replication dynamic equation, the evolutionary process of the strategy selection problem is studied, and the evolutionary stable strategies under different situations are obtained. The results show that nine factors, such as risk-sharing coefficient, risk control cost and basic income, will affect the strategic choice of both sides. More importantly, whether considering risk correlation or not may result in different final evolutionary results.
Keywords:risk correlation  public-private partnership (PPP)  risk-sharing  evolutionary game  
点击此处可从《系统工程理论与实践》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《系统工程理论与实践》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号