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基于演化博弈的平台电商信用监管机制研究
引用本文:汪旭晖,任晓雪. 基于演化博弈的平台电商信用监管机制研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 1981, 40(10): 2617-2630. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788-2019-1967-14
作者姓名:汪旭晖  任晓雪
作者单位:东北财经大学 工商管理学院, 大连 116025
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71672026,71972030);国家社会科学基金重大项目(18ZDA058);辽宁省“兴辽英才计划”项目(XLYC1804007)
摘    要:在既有研究提出平台交易市场信用"监管困局"的基础上,设计平台电商信用监管机制,基于此,构建由"平台卖家-平台电商-政府"集成的演化博弈模型,剖析平台电商信用"监管困局"的内在形成机理并加以破解.研究发现:当平台卖家采取"自律"策略的初始概率一定时,平台电商与平台卖家两个群体策略选择的演化轨迹呈周期性波动.具体而言,当平台电商提高保证金扣除比例时,平台卖家选择"自律"策略的概率则会显著提高.而当累计扣分制致使平台卖家的损失增加时,不但没有遏制平台卖家的违规行为,反而使得平台卖家采取"自律"策略的概率降低,是为平台交易市场信用"监管困局"的症结所在.因此,为了弥补平台电商对平台卖家内部监管的不足,引入政府对平台电商的外部监管,有限理性的平台电商与政府通过长期的反复博弈,最终博弈系统演化轨迹呈逐渐收敛且稳定的趋势.由此可见,政府加强监管力度并增加对平台电商的监管奖励时,平台电商采取"积极监管"策略的概率也逐渐增加,进而平台卖家采取"自律"策略的概率也将增加,是为破解平台交易市场信用"监管困局"的关键所在.最后,本文采用数值分析的方法,模拟"平台卖家-平台电商-政府"博弈的演化过程,进一步剖析该现象的动态形成过程,揭示各主体决策的一般规律,为破解平台交易市场中的信用"监管困局"提供建议.

关 键 词:演化博弈  信用监管机制  监管困局  监管力度  
收稿时间:2019-09-23

Research on credit supervision mechanism of e-commerce platform based on evolutionary game
WANG Xuhui,REN Xiaoxue. Research on credit supervision mechanism of e-commerce platform based on evolutionary game[J]. Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice, 1981, 40(10): 2617-2630. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788-2019-1967-14
Authors:WANG Xuhui  REN Xiaoxue
Affiliation:School of Business Administration, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025, China
Abstract:This paper analyzes the dynamic process of the "regulation dilemma" of e-commerce platform trading market by recent studies through simulation modeling. The game model includes the e-commerce platform, platform seller and government and analyzes the forming mechanism of the "regulation dilemma". The results show that the evolutionary trajectory of the e-commerce platform and platform seller presents a periodical fluctuation when the initial probability of the platform adopt self-discipline strategy is certain. Furthermore, the probability of the platform seller adopts the self-discipline strategy will increase when the e-commerce platform enhance the security deposit deduction ratio. The result also suggests that the reason for the "regulation dilemma" is that the accumulated deduction mechanism causes the loss of the platform seller to increase not only does it not contain the violations of the platform seller, but the probability of the platform seller adopting the self-discipline strategy is reduced. Therefore, introducing the government's external supervision for e-commerce platform, the evolutionary track of the e-commerce platform and the government through long-term repeated game presents stable equilibrium and spiral convergence. The key to cracking the "regulation dilemma" is that the government's strengthens supervision and regulatory incentives increased. The e-commerce platform will adopt active supervision. In the end, the results have some inspiration for the policies-making of government and the of credit supervision strategy of e-commerce platform.
Keywords:evolutionary game  credit supervision mechanism  regulation dilemma  supervision strength  
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