| 基于委托-代理理论的旅行社导游绩效薪金制度研究——以山东省泰安市为例 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈方英.基于委托-代理理论的旅行社导游绩效薪金制度研究——以山东省泰安市为例[J].泰山学院学报,2007,29(4):87-92. |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈方英 |
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| 作者单位： | 泰山学院,旅游与资源环境系,山东,泰安,271021 |
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| 基金项目： | 泰山学院人文社会科学研究项目;山东省教育厅资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文从委托-代理理论的视角对旅行社导游薪金制度进行研究。在山东省泰安市的实证研究结果表明:旅行社对导游实行基于绩效的薪金制度是合理和可行的;绩效薪金除了与带团时间、培训时间、旅行社的监督明显相关外,还与导游的业务量大小、工作能力、努力程度明显相关。建议旅行社经营者在制定薪金制度时,应改变目前主要考虑导游带团时间的做法,使导游的薪金能够充分反映导游为旅行社带来的经济效益,导游的工作能力和业务素质;通过合理有效的绩效薪金制度吸引和留住优秀的导游,促进旅行社企业和导游队伍的健康可持续发展。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托-代理理论 薪金制度 绩效薪金 导游 激励 |
| 文章编号： | 1672-2590（2007）04-0087-06 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007-02-18 |
A study of tour guide's performance-based salary system in travel agency: an agency theory perspective |
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| CHEN Fang-ying.A study of tour guide''''s performance-based salary system in travel agency: an agency theory perspective[J].Journal of Taishan University,2007,29(4):87-92. |
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| Authors: | CHEN Fang-ying |
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| Abstract: | The unreasonable salary system is one of main problem in guide's practical management of our country.Which cause that guide's teams are unstable and guides have poor service quality.This study utilizes agency theory in assessing the role of various factors that determine performance pay within Chinese travel agencies.Dimensions that emerged from a factor analysis include programmable job elements,the size of the transaction,principal supervision,agent expertise,time spent and the degree of agent efforts.Recommendation is given to travel agency owners or managers is considering both principal and agent factors so as to make a reasonable salary system for guide and attract and retain competent employees. |
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| Keywords: | agency theory salary system performance-based salary tour guide incentives |
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