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Judgement aggregation in scientific collaborations: The case for waiving expertise
Authors:Alexandru Marcoci  James Nguyen
Institution:Hebrew University, Program for the History and Philosophy of Science, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem, Israel;School of Humanities and Liberal Studies, San Francisco State University, USA
Abstract:The fragmentation of academic disciplines forces individuals to specialise. In doing so, they become experts over their narrow area of research. However, ambitious scientific projects, such as the search for gravitational waves, require them to come together and collaborate across disciplinary borders. How should scientists with expertise in different disciplines treat each others’ expert claims? An intuitive answer is that the collaboration should defer to the opinions of experts. In this paper we show that under certain seemingly innocuous assumptions, this intuitive answer gives rise to an impossibility result when it comes to aggregating the beliefs of experts to deliver the beliefs of a collaboration as a whole. We then argue that when experts’ beliefs come into conflict, they should waive their expert status.
Keywords:Scientific rationality  Judgement aggregation  Social epistemology  Collaboration in science
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