| "公用地悲剧"的博弈论分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 顾继光,杜栋."公用地悲剧"的博弈论分析[J].河海大学常州分校学报,2005,19(2):20-22. |
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| 作者姓名： | 顾继光 杜栋 |
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| 作者单位： | 河海大学,商学院,江苏,常州,213022 |
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| 摘 要： | 从博弈论的角度分析了“公用地悲剧”产生的原因,通过改进模型分析了相关组织应如何制定补贴政策和处罚政策,才能使博弈结果趋于理性．研究表明将补贴政策和处罚政策相结合能在一定程度上避免发生“公用地悲剧”．
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| 关 键 词： | “公用地悲剧” 博弈论 纳什均衡 补贴政策 可持续发展 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-1130(2005)02-0020-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年9月23日 |
Game Analysis on "The Tragedy of the Commons" |
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| GU Ji-guang,DU Dong.Game Analysis on "The Tragedy of the Commons"[J].Journal of Hohai University Changzhou,2005,19(2):20-22. |
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| Authors: | GU Ji-guang DU Dong |
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| Abstract: | "The Tragedy of the Commons" is a classic economic phenomenon in Property Rights. This paper analyzes the cause of "The Tragedy of the Commons" based on Game Theory. An improved model discusses how to set the policy of punishment and subsidy to rationalize the results. It proves that to certain degree "The Tragedy of the Commons" can be avoided, by integrating subsidy and punishment. |
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| Keywords: | "The Tragedy of the Commons" game theory Nash equilibrium subsidy policy sustainable development |
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