| 随机产出下两级供应链供需双方的博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 朱琳,王圣东.随机产出下两级供应链供需双方的博弈[J].系统管理学报,2011,20(6). |
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| 作者姓名： | 朱琳 王圣东 |
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| 作者单位： | 解放军电子工程学院数学教研室,合肥,230037 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072165) |
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| 摘 要： | 研究和分析了随机产出下两级供应链供需双方的三种博弈模型:销售商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型、生产商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型和纳什博弈模型,得到了在这3种博弈模型下的最优订购量和最优计划生产量,通过研究发现:当销售商在供应链决策中占主导地位时的最优订购量和最优计划生产量都大于其他2种情况下的对应值.最后,通过数值计算比较了在随机产出服从均匀分布时,这3种博弈下供需双方的最优策略及相应利润,并得出了选择销售商占主导地位的Stackelberg博弈行为将有利于商家获取更多利润的重要结论.
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| 关 键 词： | 随机产出 计划生产量 订购量 博弈 |
Game Analysis of a Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Random Yield |
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| ZHU Lin
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WANG Sheng-dong.Game Analysis of a Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Random Yield[J].Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications,2011,20(6). |
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| Authors: | ZHU Lin WANG Sheng-dong |
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| Institution: | ZHU Lin,WANG Sheng-dong(Department of Mathematics,Electronic Engineering Institute of PLA,Hefei 230037,China) |
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| Abstract: | We study three game models of a two-echelon supply chain with random yield: retailer-leader Stackelberg game model,manufacturer-leader Stackelberg game model and Nash game model,and derive the optimal order quantity and optimal planned production quantity for these models,The findings indicate that when the retailer dominates the supply chain,the optimal order quantity and optimal planned production quantity is greater than those in other models.A numerical example is given to compare the optimal policies a... |
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| Keywords: | random yield planned production quantity order quantity game |
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