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从税收博弈关系看税收征管制度的完善
引用本文:邓志萍. 从税收博弈关系看税收征管制度的完善[J]. 井冈山学院学报, 2007, 28(5M): 113-114,122
作者姓名:邓志萍
作者单位:[1]厦门大学财政系,福建厦门361005 [2]江西省国税局,江西南昌330006
摘    要:由于征纳双方信息不对称,制约着税收征管质量的进一步提升。本文用博弈论的方法,通过对征纳双方实现效用最大化的分析,得出完善税收征管制度的启示,提出相关的建议。

关 键 词:信息不对称 博弈 完善
文章编号:1673-4718(2007)05-0113-02
修稿时间:2007-01-10

Perfecting Tax Collecting and Management System:Viewed in the Light of Tax Game Relationship
DENG Zhiping. Perfecting Tax Collecting and Management System:Viewed in the Light of Tax Game Relationship[J]. Journal of Jinggangshan University, 2007, 28(5M): 113-114,122
Authors:DENG Zhiping
Affiliation:1.Xiamen University, Finance College, Xiamen 361005, China; 2.Jiangxi Provinecial State Administration of Taxation, Nanchang 330006,China
Abstract:The information asymmetry between tax collectors and tax payers restricts the further improvement of the quality of tax collection and management. This essay presents a garne-theory-based analysis of how tax collectors and tax payers realize utility maximization, offers something that will enlighten us on the improvement of tax collecting and management system, and makes some relevant suggestions.
Keywords:information asymmetry   game   perfect
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