基于声誉机制的开放式基金家族激励效率优化

首先，建立动态委托代理模型，研究业绩激励机制产生效率损失的原因和影响因素.进而，从基金家族视角建立声誉机制，优化开放式基金的激励效率.结果表明，业绩激励机制产生的效率损失，随证券市场中信息透明度的降低而增大，随投资期限的增加而降低；基金家族建立的声誉机制，能在基金经理之间产生一种正面的声誉传递作用，从而提高了开放式基金的激励效率，并在一定条件下，使其达到帕累托最优.最后，结合现实分析了所建模型的应用价值.

Incentive Efficiency Optimization of Open-End Fund Family Based on Reputation Mechanism

By setting up the dynamic principal-agent model, influencing factors of the incentive mechanism were researched on the basis of performance, and the incentive efficiency of open-end fund family was optimized. The results shown that the efficiency loss resulted from incentive mechanism will increase as the degree of information transparency in security market reduces, while decrease with the increase of the investment horizon. And the reputation mechanism set up by the fund family will exert a kind of favorable reputation transfer function, which will promote the incentive efficiency to increase, and achieve Pareto optimality under the given conditions. The practical applications of the model are revealed at last.