| 基于信息不对称理论的人力资源招聘工作研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 朱军,童夏雨. 基于信息不对称理论的人力资源招聘工作研究[J]. 杭州师范学院学报(自然科学版), 2006, 5(3): 161-163 |
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| 作者姓名： | 朱军 童夏雨 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 杭州师范学院,浙江,杭州,310036
2. 浙江财经学院,浙江,杭州,310018 |
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| 摘 要： | 信息不对称理论有两个博弈结果即信息占优势一方的“败德行为”和信息占劣势一方的“逆向选择”,在人力资源的招聘市场中两者也同样存在。从分析招聘双方的动态博弈过程着手,阐述了信息不对称对招聘工作的影响,并提出了减缓的对策和措施。
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| 关 键 词： | 信息不对称 招聘 博弈 减缓对策 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-9403(2006)03-0161-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-05-24 |
Human Resources Recruiting Based on Theory of Information Asymmetry |
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| ZHU Jun,TONG Xia-yu. Human Resources Recruiting Based on Theory of Information Asymmetry[J]. Journal of Hangzhou Teachers College(Natural Science), 2006, 5(3): 161-163 |
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| Authors: | ZHU Jun TONG Xia-yu |
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| Abstract: | There are two gaming results in information asymmetry theory: the moralit-ly corrupted behavior of the superior party and converse choice of the inferior party.They are both existed in the market of human resource recruit.This paper analyzed the mutually dynamic gaming procedure,expounded the two direct consequences resulting from information asymmetry and put forward counter-measures and steps to slow down that. |
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| Keywords: | Information asymmetry recruiting counter-measures |
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