供应链中准时采购的Stackelberg模型及决策

准时采购可有效缩短供应链整体响应周期,快速响应市场需求,实现供应链的运作。但在实践过程中,采购交付的准时性又成为供应链敏捷运作的瓶颈问题。从采购双方行为动机的角度出发,以有效的激励机制提高准时交货概率为目标,建立采购商为主方、供应商为从方的Stackelberg博弈模型;在模型的最优性分析基础上,讨论准时采购过程中采购商与供应商决策的交互影响关系;并在供应商完成采购订单所需的响应时间服从指数分布的假设下,分析采购商与供应商的最优策略及库存成本参数等对决策产生的影响。

Stackelberg Model and Decision Analysis of Just-in-Time Purchasing in Supply Chain

Just-in-Time(JIT) purchasing can shorten the response time of supply chain efficiently, respond requirement in the market rapidly, and implement the agile operation of supply chain. Furthermore, delivery on time is the bottle-neck problem of supply chain agile operation in practice. For increasing the probability of delivery on time by incentive mechanism effectively, this paper establishes the two-stage Stackelberg model, with purchaser as leader and supplier as follower. On the basis of analysis of optimum, we discuss the interactive relationship between purchaser and supplier in contract decision of purchase. On the assumption that response time the supplier fulfils the order obeys exponential distribution, we argue the strategy of optimum decision of purchaser and supplier, and analyze the effect that inventory cost parameters impact on contract decision.