| 强制减排机制下政府与企业之间的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 杨亚琴,邱菀华,何大义. 强制减排机制下政府与企业之间的博弈分析[J]. 系统工程, 2012, 0(2): 110-114 |
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| 作者姓名： | 杨亚琴 邱菀华 何大义 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京航空航天大学经济管理学院;北京航空航天大学体育部;中国地质大学人文经管学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70841004) |
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| 摘 要： | 强制减排机制是一种实现碳减排的有效途径之一,通过建立强制减排机制下企业生产的优化模型,说明企业存在突破强制减排政策的动机进行超额排放和政府加强减排监督管理的必要性,进而建立了政府与企业之间的碳减排博弈,并根据该博弈的纳什均衡特性提出相关的政策建议以提高强制减排政策的效率。
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| 关 键 词： | 碳排放 强制减排 生产优化 博弈分析 |
Carbon Abatement Game between Regulator and Firms under Command-and-control Scheme |
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| YANG Ya-qin,QIU Wan-hua,HE Da-yi. Carbon Abatement Game between Regulator and Firms under Command-and-control Scheme[J]. Systems Engineering, 2012, 0(2): 110-114 |
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| Authors: | YANG Ya-qin QIU Wan-hua HE Da-yi |
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| Affiliation: | 1.School of Economics and Management,Beihang University,Beijing 100191,China;2.Department of Physical Education,Beihang University,Beijing 100191,China;3.School of Humanities and Economics Management,China University of Geosciences,Beijing 100083,China) |
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| Abstract: | Command-and-control is an efficient way to achieve the goal carbon emission.In this paper, a simple optimization model is developed to demonstrate that carbon emission constraints will restrain the firm from increasing its product under command-and-control regulation,which presents a motivation for firms to break the command-and-control regulation,and the necessity for regulators to strengthen the supervision and administration.Then a game between firms and regulators on carbon abatement is put forward to analyze their optimal strategies under the command-and-control scheme.Based on the equilibrium of the game,several suggestions are presented to promote the efficiency of command-and-control scheme. |
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| Keywords: | Carbon Emission Command-and-control Production Optimization Game Analysis |
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