基于计算机试验的进化博弈研究

采用理论分析与计算机试验的方法研究一类常见的社会悖论问题———重复多人囚犯博弈问题.用随机试验方法对局中人的各种博弈法则进行分析比较,研究支付函数与博弈环境对各博弈法则性能指标的影响.并以进化博弈的观点,讨论在长期的重复博弈过程中,博弈法则进化到某种稳定状态的情况.     

房地产企业之间的竞争策略选择

利用修正后的贝特兰德模型，分析了房地产企业间的价格博弈与企业联盟的“囚徒”困境。在对模型分析的结果和我国房地产市场的实际情况进行分析的基础上，给出了房地产企业之间的异质性竞争策略，并提出相应的对策建议。     

论《赵氏孤儿》的悲剧快感

《赵氏孤儿》是著名的古典悲剧,给人带来悲的世界,但这种悲不是绝望的悲,是一种给人奋发向上的悲。悲剧中既有痛感的体现,也有一种快感在其中。讨论《赵氏孤儿》戏剧的悲剧快感,主要从韩厥两难处境、屠岸贾的过场作用对《赵氏孤儿》加以审美的分析和提炼,从艺术自身的角度看待《赵氏孤儿》方能体会到它长久不衰的魅力。     

西藏农村人力资本投资困境分析

农村人口综合素质整体不高,日益成为西藏农村反贫困和可持续发展的重要制约因素之一,加大人力资本投资日益迫切.文章提出没有基于本地化的农村办学思路,师资队伍整体落后与教育质量不高长期并存,教育投资观念偏差根深蒂固,基层卫生服务能力薄弱及健康知识普及严重不足等是当前西藏农村人力资本投资存在的诸多困境,并指出尽快优化教育发展结构、突出师资队伍建设、加强成人培训力度、关注妇女儿童健康是提高农村人口发展能力的重要途径.     

Nationalism Reflected in Barometer Rising

Hugh MacLennan is a famous Canadian novelist and essayist. In his long literary career, he wrote a great number of works and gained many literary honors. But above all, he is a writer, focusing on national issues of Canada, which is well demonstrated by his first novel-Barometer Rising, in which nationalism abounds. This paper covers three parts. Chapter one is mainly about Hugh MacLennan, his first work Barometer RAsing as well as the introduction to nationalism and MacLennan＇s contribution in fiction in this respect. Chapter two focuses on nationalism in his first novel. The last chapter is the conclusion part in which we know that well awakened, the Canadians are striving to pursue their real independence and stares on the international stage.     

普遍信任视角下城市居民绿色住宅支付意愿的影响因素:中国部分一线城市的证据

绿色住宅的推广和使用是降低建筑能耗、实现减排目标的重要途径.基于普遍信任视角,从居民内在心理因素与外在情境因素入手,系统构建城市居民绿色住宅支付意愿影响因素的研究模型,并探求普遍信任的一阶及高阶调节效应及影响该效应发挥作用的边界条件.结果显示,对于内在心理因素,普遍信任对居民绿色住宅认知与支付意愿的关系有显著的正向调节作用,但易受到居民损失规避心理的负向影响;普遍信任对居民环境关心与支付意愿的关系有显著的正向调节作用,且易受到居民广告诉求(来源可靠性诉求和利已诉求)的正向影响;普遍信任对居民道德认同与支付意愿的关系有显著的正向调节作用,且易受到居民高解释水平的正向影响.对于外在情境因素,普遍信任对社会风气/群体压力与支付意愿的关系有显著的正向调节作用,且权威认证标识有助于增加居民对绿色住宅的"初始信任",助推居民主动购买绿色住宅社会风气的形成.基于实证研究结论,在政府、开发商及居民个体层面提出相应建议.     

囚徒困境中基于非均匀连接的促合作控制设计

本文研究"囚徒困境"中促进合作演化的机制,设计"合作识别"和"背叛识别"两种控制形式,并分析合作在相应控制之下的演化路径问题.在合作识别控制设计中,通过将博弈群体分为合作者子群体和合作者与背叛者共存子群体,形成连接率依赖于个体策略的"非均匀连接",以保护合作的方式抑制背叛,促进合作演化;在背叛识别控制设计中,以惩罚背叛的方式鼓励合作.文章指出,合作识别控制设计能在合作率较低时促进合作,但不能使合作成为演化稳定策略(ESS);背叛识别控制设计能在合作率较高时使合作成为ESS,但是背叛总是该控制下的ESS.结合"合作识别"控制与"背叛识别"控制,本文设计一种切换控制,使得合作是"囚徒困境"博弈的唯一ESS.仿真给出不同要求下的控制律设计,分析不同切换选择对合作演化路径的影响.     

Spatial prisoner’s dilemma games with increasing size of the interaction neighborhood on regular lattices

We studied the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice where the size of the interaction neighborhood is considered. Firstly, the effects of noise and the cost-to-benefit ratio on the maintenance of cooperation were investigated. The results indicate that the cooperation frequency depends on the noise and cost-to-benefit ratio: cooperation reaches a climax as noise increases, but it monotonously decreases and even vanishes with the ratio increasing. Furthermore, we investigated how the size of the interaction neighborhood affects the emergence of cooperation in detail. Our study demonstrates that cooperation is remarkably enhanced by an increase in the size of the interaction neighborhood. However, cooperation died out when the size of the interaction neighborhood became too large since the system was similar to the mean-field system. On this basis, a cluster-forming mechanism acting among cooperators was also explored, and it showed that the moderate range of the neighborhood size is beneficial for forming larger cooperative clusters. Finally, large-scale Monte Carlo simulations were carried out to visualize and interpret these phenomena explicitly.     

姹紫嫣红开遍——职场小说的繁荣、困境与前景探析

职场小说在近几年火爆文坛,各种原因促成了职场小说的繁荣,虽然职场小说自身发展的困境不容忽视,但职场小说大繁荣的前景指日可待。