Ideals and monisms: recent criticisms of the Strong Programme in the sociology of knowledge

I offer a reply to criticisms of the Strong Programme presented by Stephen Kemp who develops some new lines of argument that focus on the ‘monism’ of the programme. He says the programme should be rejected for three reasons. First, because it embodies ‘weak idealism’, that is, its supporters effectively sever the link between language and the world. Second, it challenges the reasons that scientists offer in explanation of their own beliefs. Third, it destroys the distinction between successful and unsuccessful instrumental action. Kemp is careful to produce quotations from the supporters of the programme as evidence to support his case. All three points deserve and are given a detailed response and the interpretation of the quoted material plays a significant role in the discussion. My hope is that careful exegesis will offset the numerous misinterpretations that are current in the philosophical literature. Particular attention is paid to what is said about the normative standards involved in the application of empirical concepts. The operation of these standards in the face of the negotiability of all concepts is explored and misapprehensions on the topic are corrected. The work of Wittgenstein, Popper, Kuhn and Hesse is used to illustrate these themes.     

Saving the Strong Programme? A critique of David Bloor’s recent work

This article critically appraises David Bloor’s recent attempts to refute criticisms levelled at the Strong Programme’s social constructionist approach to scientific knowledge. Bloor has tried to argue, contrary to some critics, that the Strong Programme is not idealist in character, and it does not involve a challenge to the credibility of scientific knowledge. I argue that Bloor’s attempt to deflect the charge of idealism, which calls on the self-referential theory of social institutions, is partially successful. However, I suggest that although the Strong Programme should not be accused of ‘strong idealism’, it is still vulnerable to the criticism that it entails a form of ‘weak idealism’. The article moves on to argue that, contrary to Bloor, constructionist approaches do challenge the credibility of the scientific knowledge that they analyse. I conclude the article by arguing that sociological analyses of scientific knowledge can be conducted without the weak idealism and the credibility-challenging assumptions of the Strong Programme approach.     

现代学习理论在计算机辅助教学中的应用研究

现代学习理论认为学习要以学生为中心，要求学生由外部刺激的被动接受者转变为信息加工的主体和知识结构的主动建构者，同时要求教师从知识的传授者、灌输者转变为学生主动建构知识结构的帮助者、促进者．因此，计算机辅助教学的设计应体现学生的中心地位，应强调“情境”对知识结构建构的重要作用，强调“协作学习”，强调知识的应用与发展．     

论认知主义科学哲学的出路

当代西方科学哲学正在朝着认知主义发展,它们在理解科学本质时仍存在内在论与外在论、自然化与社会化的争论。本文认为,要正确认识科学的本质问题,就必须把认识论置于“文化建构论”之上。以文化建构论为基础,辩证地理解认识的形成、发展、认识的标准、科学的本质等等。     

Systemic therapy: An overview

An outline is given of the historical development of systems ideas within the field of therapy. A history of systemic therapy is provided, from the early days of the Mental Research Institute to recent influences upon therapeutic practice. Key applications of theory are described and current areas of debate are highlighted.     

后现代社会建构论对主客思维的超越

主客思维是现代文化的重要特征，但主客对立只是作为自明的预设，不耐深究。从休谟、康德到罗蒂，主客关系不断遭遇合法性危机，后现代社会建构论实现了对它的彻底解构。社会建构论对主客思维的超越表现为以社会建构认识论取代主客符合论，以建构本体取代物质或精神本体，以“关系的人”取代“本质的人”。社会建构论对主客思维的超越预示了现代文化的终结。     

迷思与坚守——反思新闻客观性

新闻报道的客观性,是新闻业最重要的职业理想之一,但因为存在认识论基础和操作实践的双重困境,是以新闻客观性一直以来受到多方面的挑战。建构主义认为新闻不过是一种社会建构的产物;而实践中又因为新闻受到政治、经济和文化偏见的干扰,而难守客观性。但在没有找到更好的方式呈现事实真相之时,对客观性保持必要的尊重并努力付诸实践仍然是最好的选择。     

浅谈制约视障大学英语教学因素及教学模式改革

视障大学英语教学已成为大学英语教学的特殊领域,并得到充分的重视。本文分析制约视障大学英语教学的心理、情感、文化和社会等因素,并指出建构主义学习理论是视障大学英语教学的理论基础,同时,详尽论述视障大学英语教学在建构主义理论指导下的可行性教学模式。     

客观主义与建构主义:对立及其超越

客观主义是西方主流心理学的典型特征。客观主义导致了心理学中的价值中立论、方法中心论、普适主义和本质主义的观点。社会建构论的兴起挑战了心理学中的客观主义传统,主张实在是建构出来的,不存在超越文化的普遍真理。作者认为,客观主义和建构主义并非非此即彼,应该在科学主义与反科学主义、本质主义与反本质主义、经验主义和相对主义三个方面超越心理学中的客观主义和建构主义的对立。     

Saving the Strong Programme: a critique of Stephen Kemp’s recent paper

In this paper I intend to discuss some of the views put forward by Stephen Kemp in his recent critique of the Strong Program (Kemp, 2005). In particular I will try to defend David Bloor’s SSK against the charge of weak idealism brought up by Stephen Kemp in his paper. The widely held accusation, namely, according to which the social constructionist approach to scientific knowledge is strongly idealist, is already rejected by Kemp himself. He argues, however that Bloor’s attempts to divert the charge of idealism from the Strong Programme were not successful with respect to the kind of idealism that Kemp calls ‘weak idealism’, that is, treating scientific discourse as free-floating and unrelated to the world of things. I intend to argue that Kemp’s charges are unfounded when levelled at Bloor’s views on meaning and reference. Kemp deals with two issues of the Bloorian program: with the social constructionist approach to concepts as self-referential social institutions, and with the actor/analyst distinction introduced by the Strong Programmers. I will focus only on the first issue in my paper.