论信念在认识活动中的双重作用

信念在人们的认识活动中发挥着双重作用。一方面,信念起到纽带、选择、动力、预测和定向的积极作用;另一方面,它起到僵化、误导和抑制的消极作用。     

清末泰山信仰在海岱间的传布——以青山碧霞宫与大泽山日照庵为中心

就山东一境而言,泰山崇拜和碧霞元君信仰在海岱之间自西向东传布。据目前所掌握的资料,泰山信仰传布的力度从明代至清前期渐趋增长,而自光绪末年至民国却是一个转折。本文选定青山碧霞宫与大泽山日照庵两座庙宇作为研究中心,来探讨泰山信仰清末民初在泰山到滨海一线的传布情况。泰山信仰在海岱之间传布过程中,受到空间距离、地域文化等客观因素的制约,呈涟漪状,以泰山为中心,越趋向边缘（边远）地区,影响力越弱;即使有稳定文化内核的碧霞元君信仰,也经受了诸多损益,多种神灵品格层累而至于在青山庙宇出现相互矛盾的几个碧霞元君,在大泽山也经历了从碧霞元君到无生老母的主神转变。     

畲汉陈十四信仰的比较研究

陈十四信仰在畲汉两族的生活中扮演了重要角色,畲汉两族在陈十四传说的内容与陈十四信仰的形式上体现了同质性,但在陈十四传说的口述形式、记录文本以及民众对陈十四信仰的艺术展演上则表现出异质性.共同的心理诉求是畲汉两族对陈十四信仰趋同的重要因素;畲族对汉族强势文化的认同是畲汉两族陈十四信仰同质性的中坚力量;畲族民族意识的延续是畲汉两族陈十四信仰异质性的核心原因.     

基于BDI的Agent动态推理模型

本文基于慎思式Agem的理论,研究如何发展Agent的适应能力,对现有Agent的推理模型作了改进,提出了一个具有动态推理能力的Agem模型,在文章的最后用一个简单的事例验证了这种推理过程的合理性。     

礼贤城隍庙：地方历史与区域文化的“记忆之所”

当传统在现代的冲击下与日常生活发生脱节时,人们往往通过保护一些过去留下的丈化遗产,试图留住传统,加固文化记忆。礼贤城隍庙原本是个民间宗教场所,但在它被列为当地的文物保护单位之后,这里也变成了一个当地人寄托怀古之情和确认文化身份的公共场所,也就是一个浓缩了当地历史和区域文化的“记忆之所”。复兴后的城隍庙会,也不再是纯粹的宗教性节日,而变成了一种带有象征性和表演性的当地文化资本。认识到城隍庙的这一功能演变,当事人及主管部门应抛开各种政治包袱,尽力去挖掘和恢复传统的民间信仰文化,让这些物质的和非物质的文化遗产能在新的文化语境中重放光彩。     

社交网络中基于信任评估的推荐控制模型

针对社交网络中无法有效管理陌生推荐安全性难题,提出了一种基于信任的评估推荐控制模型(TRCM).该模型描述了社交网络推荐中个体角色、推荐路径、可信任值、控制规则等方面内容.模型结合社交网络个体之间取信度、信誉度评估方法,分别计算串路型、并路型和复合型3类推荐信任度,并给出了客观偏移度和信心指数评估.同时,TRCM定义了一组信任控制规则以管理社交网络中的推荐行为.实验表明,该方法是有效可行的.     

Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership with Uncertain Information

1 ＩＮＴＲＯＤＵＣＴＩＯＮＩｎｒｅｃｅｎｔｙｅａｒｓ,ｍａｎｙｅｆｆｏｒｔｓｈａｖｅｂｅｅｎｍａｄｅｔｏｅｘｐｌｏｒｅｎｏｎ ｃｏｏｐｅｒａｔｉｖｅｇａｍｅｔｈｅｏｒｙｆｒｏｍａｄｅｃｉｓｉｏｎ -ｔｈｅｏｒｅｔｉｃｖｉｅｗｐｏｉｎｔ.Ｏｐｐｏｓｉｔｅｔｏｔｈｅｔｒａｄｉｔｉｏｎａｌｖｉｅｗｏｆｍｉｘｅｄｓｔｒａｔｅｇｉｅｓａｓｃｏｎｓｃｉｏｕｓｒａｎｄｏｍｉｚａｔｉｏｎｓ,ｐｌａｙｅｒｓｄｏｎｏｔｐｅｒ ｆｏｒｍｒａｎｄｏｍｉｚａｔｉｏｎ .Ｏｎｅｐｌａｙｅｒｃｈｏｏｓｅｓａｄｅｆｉｎｉｔｅａｃｔｉｏ…     

Seeking Allies: Modelling How Listeners Choose Their Musical Friends

In this paper we describe in some detail a formal computer model of inferential discourse based on a belief system. The key issue is that a logical model in a computer, based on rational sets, can usefully model a human situation based on irrational sets. The background of this work is explained elsewhere, as is the issue of rational and irrational sets (Billinge and Addis, in: Magnani and Dossena (eds.), Computing, philosophy and cognition, 2004; Stepney et al., Journey: Non-classical philosophy—socially sensitive computing in journeys non-classical computation: A grand challenge for computing research, 2004). The model is based on the Belief System (Addis and Gooding, Proceedings of the AISB’99 Symposium on Scientific Creativity, 1999) and it provides a mechanism for choosing queries based on a range of belief. We explain how it provides a way to update the belief based on query results, thus modelling others’ experience by inference. We also demonstrate that for the same internal experience, different models can be built for different actors.

John Dewey's pragmatist alternative to the belief-acceptance dichotomy

Defenders of value-free science appeal to cognitive attitudes as part of a wedge strategy, to mark a distinction between science proper and the uses of science for decision-making, policy, etc. Distinctions between attitudes like belief and acceptance have played an important role in defending the value-free ideal. In this paper, I will explore John Dewey's pragmatist philosophy of science as an alternative to the philosophical framework the wedge strategy rests on. Dewey does draw significant and useful distinctions between different sorts of cognitive attitudes taken by inquirers, but none can be used to support the wedge strategy.     

The love of truth

It is frequently said that belief aims at truth, in an explicitly normative sense—that is, that one ought to believe the proposition that p if, and only if, p is true. This truth norm is frequently invoked to explain why we should seek evidential justification in our beliefs, or why we should try to be rational in our belief formation—it is because we ought to believe the truth that we ought to follow the evidence in belief revision. In this paper, I argue that this view is untenable. The truth norm clashes with plausible evidential norms in a wide range of cases, such as when we have excellent but misleading evidence for a falsehood or no evidence for a truth. I will consider various ways to resolve this conflict and argue that none of them work. However, I will ultimately attempt to vindicate the love of truth, by arguing that knowledge is the proper epistemic goal. The upshot is that we should not aim merely to believe the truth; we should aim to know it.