区间值语义下的Agent信念模型

从实际应用出发,在逻辑系统基础上,结合二维区间值语义,构建Agent模糊信念模型,并研究该模型语义的数理基础,分析系统可靠性、完备性以及重言式结构等特性,最后给出一些应用,这些研究不仅为Agent信念复杂性研究,而且也为Agent认知、决策等研究提供一定的逻辑理论基础.     

The love of truth

It is frequently said that belief aims at truth, in an explicitly normative sense—that is, that one ought to believe the proposition that p if, and only if, p is true. This truth norm is frequently invoked to explain why we should seek evidential justification in our beliefs, or why we should try to be rational in our belief formation—it is because we ought to believe the truth that we ought to follow the evidence in belief revision. In this paper, I argue that this view is untenable. The truth norm clashes with plausible evidential norms in a wide range of cases, such as when we have excellent but misleading evidence for a falsehood or no evidence for a truth. I will consider various ways to resolve this conflict and argue that none of them work. However, I will ultimately attempt to vindicate the love of truth, by arguing that knowledge is the proper epistemic goal. The upshot is that we should not aim merely to believe the truth; we should aim to know it.     

民间信仰的历史传承与申遗策略——以温州宁村“汤和信仰”为例

浙江温州龙湾区“汤和信仰”是地方民间信仰中最具特殊性、典型性的个案之一。通过文献资料和田野材料，叙述了从“汤和信仰”到“汤和信俗”的产生、演变过程，分析了汤和信仰在历史上曾属于国家和民间两个层面的特点，阐释了汤和信仰申遗成功的背景、策略和意义。     

LDPC码概述及若干理论和应用问题

低密度奇偶校验码（LDPC码）被普遍认为是当今最先进的一种纠错码（信道编码）。LDPC码，图模型，迭代译码的研究热潮已在全球流行有10年以上。这篇论文高度概括的简述了LDPC码的背景和基本知识，从一些独特的视角并联系多个领域提出一些对LDPC码相关知识的理解方法和见解主张，总结了LDPC码当今最新的研究进展。从理论和应用两方面提出作者认为非常有意义的研究问题。     

论信念在认识活动中的双重作用

信念在人们的认识活动中发挥着双重作用。一方面，信念起到纽带、选择、动力、预测和定向的积极作用；另一方面，它起到僵化、误导和抑制的消极作用。     

清末泰山信仰在海岱间的传布——以青山碧霞宫与大泽山日照庵为中心

就山东一境而言,泰山崇拜和碧霞元君信仰在海岱之间自西向东传布。据目前所掌握的资料,泰山信仰传布的力度从明代至清前期渐趋增长,而自光绪末年至民国却是一个转折。本文选定青山碧霞宫与大泽山日照庵两座庙宇作为研究中心,来探讨泰山信仰清末民初在泰山到滨海一线的传布情况。泰山信仰在海岱之间传布过程中,受到空间距离、地域文化等客观因素的制约,呈涟漪状,以泰山为中心,越趋向边缘（边远）地区,影响力越弱;即使有稳定文化内核的碧霞元君信仰,也经受了诸多损益,多种神灵品格层累而至于在青山庙宇出现相互矛盾的几个碧霞元君,在大泽山也经历了从碧霞元君到无生老母的主神转变。     

畲汉陈十四信仰的比较研究

陈十四信仰在畲汉两族的生活中扮演了重要角色,畲汉两族在陈十四传说的内容与陈十四信仰的形式上体现了同质性,但在陈十四传说的口述形式、记录文本以及民众对陈十四信仰的艺术展演上则表现出异质性.共同的心理诉求是畲汉两族对陈十四信仰趋同的重要因素;畲族对汉族强势文化的认同是畲汉两族陈十四信仰同质性的中坚力量;畲族民族意识的延续是畲汉两族陈十四信仰异质性的核心原因.     

Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership with Uncertain Information

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John Dewey's pragmatist alternative to the belief-acceptance dichotomy

Defenders of value-free science appeal to cognitive attitudes as part of a wedge strategy, to mark a distinction between science proper and the uses of science for decision-making, policy, etc. Distinctions between attitudes like belief and acceptance have played an important role in defending the value-free ideal. In this paper, I will explore John Dewey's pragmatist philosophy of science as an alternative to the philosophical framework the wedge strategy rests on. Dewey does draw significant and useful distinctions between different sorts of cognitive attitudes taken by inquirers, but none can be used to support the wedge strategy.     

The ecological rationality of explanatory reasoning

There is growing evidence that explanatory considerations influence how people change their degrees of belief in light of new information. Recent studies indicate that this influence is systematic and may result from people’s following a probabilistic update rule. While formally very similar to Bayes’ rule, the rule or rules people appear to follow are different from, and inconsistent with, that better-known update rule. This raises the question of the normative status of those updating procedures. Is the role explanation plays in people’s updating their degrees of belief a bias? Or are people right to update on the basis of explanatory considerations, in that this offers benefits that could not be had otherwise? Various philosophers have argued that any reasoning at deviance with Bayesian principles is to be rejected, and so explanatory reasoning, insofar as it deviates from Bayes’ rule, can only be fallacious. We challenge this claim by showing how the kind of explanation-based update rules to which people seem to adhere make it easier to strike the best balance between being fast learners and being accurate learners. Borrowing from the literature on ecological rationality, we argue that what counts as the best balance is intrinsically context-sensitive, and that a main advantage of explanatory update rules is that, unlike Bayes’ rule, they have an adjustable parameter which can be fine-tuned per context. The main methodology to be used is agent-based optimization, which also allows us to take an evolutionary perspective on explanatory reasoning.