Supervenience and (non-modal) reductionism in Leibniz’s philosophy of time

It has recently been suggested that, for Leibniz, temporal facts globally supervene on causal facts, with the result that worlds differing with respect to their causal facts can be indiscernible with respect to their temporal facts. Such an interpretation is at variance with more traditional readings of Leibniz’s causal theory of time, which hold that Leibniz reduces temporal facts to causal facts. In this article, I argue against the global supervenience construal of Leibniz’s philosophy of time. On the view of Leibniz defended here, he adopts a non-modal reduction of time to events, a form of reductionism that entails a strong covariation between a world’s temporal facts and its causal facts. Consequently, worlds discernible with respect to their temporal facts must be discernible with respect to their causal facts, and worlds discernible with respect to their causal facts must be discernible with respect to their temporal facts. This position strongly favors the standard identificatory reduction of time to causation often imputed to Leibniz.     

The ontology of artefacts: the hard problem

We examine to what extent an adequate ontology of technical artefacts can be based on existing general accounts of the relation between higher-order objects and their material basis. We consider two of these accounts: supervenience and constitution. We take as our starting point the thesis that artefacts have a ‘dual nature’, that is, that they are both material bodies and functional objects. We present two criteria for an adequate ontology of artefacts, ‘Underdetermination’ (UD) and ‘Realizability Constraints’ (RC), which address aspects of the dual nature thesis. Assessing supervenience accounts, we find them either wanting with respect to these criteria or insufficiently informative. Next, we argue that a recent application of Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view to artefacts cannot (yet) meet our criteria, although the broader view leaves room for improvement. Based on our evaluation of the most promising candidates, we conclude that so far general metaphysical views fail to address the most salient features of artefacts. Although they can account for the fact that artefacts have a ‘dual nature’, they do not offer the conceptual resources needed to describe the relation between these natures; this relation raises a hard problem in metaphysics.     

Holism, physical theories and quantum mechanics

Motivated by the question what it is that makes quantum mechanics a holistic theory (if so), I try to define for general physical theories what we mean by `holism'. For this purpose I propose an epistemological criterion to decide whether or not a physical theory is holistic, namely: a physical theory is holistic if and only if it is impossible in principle to infer the global properties, as assigned in the theory, by local resources available to an agent. I propose that these resources include at least all local operations and classical communication. This approach is contrasted with the well-known approaches to holism in terms of supervenience. The criterion for holism proposed here involves a shift in emphasis from ontology to epistemology. I apply this epistemological criterion to classical physics and Bohmian mechanics as represented on a phase and configuration space respectively, and for quantum mechanics (in the orthodox interpretation) using the formalism of general quantum operations as completely positive trace non-increasing maps. Furthermore, I provide an interesting example from which one can conclude that quantum mechanics is holistic in the above mentioned sense, although, perhaps surprisingly, no entanglement is needed.     

还原模型与功能主义——兼评金在权的还原的物理主义

首先对内格尔的经典还原模型和金在权的功能还原模型做了比较,并指出,内格尔模型是在认识论或方法论的层面提出的,而金在权模型是在实践论或本体论的层面提出的;因此,这两个还原模型不是对立的,而是互补的。接着深入到个别事件的内部结构,对金在权的局部还原理论做出分析和评价,并指出其困境和出路。在金在权的三元有序组的事件结构的基础上提出四元有序组的事件结构,据此对功能意义和功能结构作出区分,进一步揭示了功能整体与其实现者之间的随附性关系。最后强调功能实在论的本体论立场,并借助实体-偶性和原因-结果这两对先验范畴对功能实在论和随附性概念给以形而上学的说明和辩护。     

Physicalism,realization, and structure

In the philosophy of mind and psychology, a central question since the 1960s has been that of how to give a philosophically adequate formulation of mind-body physicalism. A large quantity of work on the topic has been done in the interim. There have been, and continue to be, extensive discussions of the ideas of physicalism, identity, functionalism, realization, and constitution. My aim in this paper is a modest one: it is to get clearer about these ideas and some of their interrelations. After providing some background and history, I shall focus on two related topics: the distinction between a functional property and a structural one and the dispute over whether a realization account of the mental-physical relation provides a better physicalist account than a constitutional account.     

新二元论的突现论路径

物理主义尽管在现当代西方心灵哲学中发展迅猛、硕果累累,但二元论在死灰复燃之后也呈上升之势。除传统的理论形态经辩护重新粉墨登场之外,还出现了许多新的样式,如量子二元论、自然主义二元论等。到达二元论结论的途径和论证方式也在不断创新,突现论就是其中的一种。M．尼达-鲁梅林等人在根据随附性理论对突现概念做出重新阐释的基础上,不仅承诺存在着物质性身体和作为个体的经验主体这样两类实体,而且强调它们各有自己不能相互归并的属性。查默斯等人在对突现论做出区分的基础上强调：弱突现论一致于物理主义,而强突现论则只会导致二元论的结论。新二元论者的突现论研究尽管有其局限性,但也有积极的意义,不仅深化和拓展了心灵哲学的研究,而且为突现论本身的研究做出了有益的奉献。     

当代整体论的一个新范式：复杂系统突现论——复杂性科学哲学对整体论的发展

整体论与还原论的问题既是科学和哲学中的一个长期争论不休的古老论题,也是当代复杂性科学和哲学试图回答的一个核心课题。复杂性科学哲学对整体论的发展主要体现在：对复杂系统突现机理的揭示;对突现性与依随性的反思;对系统整体所具有的下向因果关系的探讨。这些新观点和新理论使突现性与整体性、因果性与层次性、信息与控制、自组织与进化等系统整体论的核心概念更加清晰,特别是,借助于系统宏观层次具有的＂下向因果关系＂（Downward Causation）的探讨,整体性质与部分性质之间律则的依随关系,系统整体的不可还原性等问题得到了深入和细致的说明,使复杂系统突现论正在成为当代整体论的一个新范式。     

Holographic space and time: Emergent in what sense?

This paper proposes a metaphysics for holographic duality. In addition to the AdS/CFT correspondence I also consider the dS/CFT conjecture of duality. Both involve non-perturbative string theory and both are exact dualities. But while the AdS/CFT keeps time at the margins of the story, the dS/CFT conjecture gives to time the “space” it deserves by presenting an interesting holographic model of it. My goals in this paper can be summarized in the following way. First, I argue that the formal structure and physical content of the duality do not support the standard philosophical reading of the relation in terms of grounding. Second, I put forward a philosophical scheme mainly extrapolated from the double aspect monism theory. I read holographic duality in this framework as it seems to fit the mathematical and physical structure of the duality smoothly. Inside this framework I propose a notion of spacetime emergence alternative to those ones commonly debated in the AdS/CFT physics and philosophy circles.     

Supervenience和Emergence之辨析——论Supervenience和Emergence两者的融合

Emergence概念产生时与supervenience一直紧密相连.现在对两者的讨论又达到了另一个高潮.本文对两者进行了简单地辨析,探讨"supervenience"所表述的"关系",并分析了supervenience在解释问题时遇到的困难.主张将supervenience和Emergence结合起来进行讨论,这有助于我们理清众多问题.通过两者的互补,为我们解释精神现象提供新的思路,为supervenience和Emergence提供一个核心的本体论来支持我们的非还原主义的观点和立场.