The silence of the norms: The missing historiography of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

History has been disparaged since the late 19th century for not conforming to norms of scientific explanation. Nonetheless, as a matter of fact a work of history upends the regnant philosophical conception of science in the second part of the 20th century. Yet despite its impact, Kuhn’s Structure has failed to motivate philosophers to ponder why works of history should be capable of exerting rational influence on an understanding of philosophy of science. But all this constitutes a great irony and a mystery. The mystery consists of the persistence of a complete lack of interest in efforts to theorize historical explanation. Fundamental questions regarding why an historical account could have any rational influence remain not merely unanswered, but unasked. The irony arises from the fact that analytic philosophy of history went into an eclipse where it remains until this day just around the time that the influence of Kuhn’s great work began to make itself felt. This paper highlights puzzles long ignored regarding the challenges a work of history managed to pose to the epistemic authority of science, and what this might imply generally for the place of philosophy of history vis-à-vis the problems of philosophy.     

I am knowledge. Get me out of here! On localism and the universality of science

It has become increasingly common in historiography of science to understand science and its products as inherently local. However, this orientation is faced with three problems. First, how can one explain the seeming universality of contemporary science? Second, if science is so reflective of its local conditions of production, how can it travel so effortlessly to other localities and even globally? And third, how can scientific knowledge attain validity outside its context of origin? I will argue that the notion of standardization and theories of delocalization manage to explain the ‘globality’ of science, but that localism denies ‘universality’ if it is understood non-spatially. Further, localism limits the validity of scientific knowledge unacceptably inside the laboratory walls or other boundaries of knowledge creation. This is not consistent with scientific practice. I will consider on what grounds extra-local knowledge inferences that transcend the boundaries of locality could be seen as justified.     

Science, truth and history, part II. Metaphysical bolt-holes for the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge?

Historians of science have frequently sought to exclude modern scientific knowledge from their narratives. Part I of this paper, published in the previous issue, cautioned against seeing more than a literary preference at work here. In particular, it was argued—contra advocates of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK)—that a commitment to epistemological relativism should not be seen as having straightforward historiographical consequences. Part II considers further SSK-inspired attempts to entangle the currently fashionable historiography with particular positions in the philosophy of science. None, I argue, is promising. David Bloor’s proposed alliance with scientific realism relies upon a mistaken view of contrastive explanation; Andrew Pickering’s appeal to instrumentalism is persuasive for particle physics but much less so for science as a whole; and Bruno Latour’s home-grown metaphysics is so bizarre that its compatibility with SSK is, if anything, a further blow to the latter’s plausibility.     

20世纪20年代中国西方史学课程建设研究——以留美学人为考察对象

伴随20世纪前期中国高等院校的发展、中国世界史课程的多样性与细化以及中国高等院校"史学系"的诞生,到20世纪20年代,以北京大学为主要阵地,中国西方史学课程正式开设。留美学人通过讲坛授课、翻译西方史著、编写教材等途径传播西方史学理论和方法,让西方史学成为中国史学的重要内容,使中国史学与世界接轨,对中国西方史学课程的建设做出了重大的贡献。     

Hélène Metzger: the history of science between the study of mentalities and total history

In this article, I examine the historiographical ideas of the historian of chemistry Hélène Metzger (1886–1944) against the background of the ideas of the members of the groups and institutions in which she worked, including Alexandre Koyré, Gaston Bachelard, Abel Rey, Henri Berr and Lucien Febrve. This article is on two interdependent levels: that of particular institutions and groups in which she worked (the Centre de Synthèse, the International Committee for History of Science, the Institut d'Histoire des Sciences et Techniques (Sorbonne) and the École Pratique des Hautes Études) and that of historiographical ideas. I individuate two particular theoretical aspirations pursued by the historians in Metzger's milieu: the ideal of total history and the study of the human mind. These two objectives were seen by Metzger and many others as implicating each other. Moreover, Metzger and other historians wanted to integrate the practice of commentary of texts in the realisations of those ideals. I argue, however, that these objectives proved very difficult to realise at the same time. One tradition which stemmed out of these discussions, exemplified by Bachelard, Canguilhem and Foucault, focused on the mind and knowledge, and renounced commentary of texts and total history as it was understood by the historians of the Centre de Synthèse. The latter, however, did not really pursue the study of the mind. Moreover, historians like Metzger and Koyré who practised an attentive analysis of texts could not realise total history.     

Scientific patronage in the age of Darwin: The curious case of William Boyd Dawkins

This essay examines the curious relationship between Charles Darwin and the palaeontologist William Boyd Dawkins (1837–1929). Dawkins was a beneficiary of Darwin's patronage and styled himself as a Darwinian to Darwin and the public, yet viciously attacked Darwin and his theory in anonymous reviews. This has confused historians who have misunderstood the exact nature of Dawkins's attitude towards evolution and his relationship to Darwin. The present study explains both the reasons for Dawkins's contradictory statements and his relationship with Darwin. I introduce Batesian mimicry as a conceptual framework to make sense of Dawkins's actions, suggesting that Dawkins mimicked a Darwinian persona in order to secure advancement in the world of Victorian science. Dawkins's pro-Darwinian stance, therefore, was a façade, an act of mimicry. I argue that Dawkins exploited Darwin for his patronage – which took the form of advice, support from Darwin's well-placed friends, and monetary assistance – while safely expressing his dissent from Darwinian orthodoxy in the form of anonymous reviews. This is, therefore, a case study in how scientific authority and power could be gained and maintained in Victorian science by professing allegiance to Darwin and Darwinism.     

论朱一新的史学

晚清道成以降的学术多有对乾嘉学术的反动,但乾嘉考据学风很大程度已内化到士人治学之中。考察这一阶段的学术,当见其变与不变。朱一新在义理与致用的焦急下,治学欲一反乾嘉轨则,另辟蹊径,确有独出之处,可又自觉不自觉地受到考据学风的影响。在经学与史学、汉学与宋学之间、孤怀闳识与精审超绝之间,他的史学也呈现着多重的面貌。     

欧洲近代史学与傅斯年的学术思想

欧洲近代史学作为一种舶来品,对于中国史学从传统走向现代,起到了至为重要的推动作用。在欧洲近代史学东传的过程中,傅斯年穿针引线,对欧洲近代史学的引介不遗余力,贡献尤著。尤其是,他对巴克尔史学的借鉴、兰克治史理念的宣扬,以及德国"种族-文化"观念的运用,不仅成为其取得重要史学成就的学术渊源,而且为转型期的中国史学创辟了一条新路径。同时,欧洲近代史学经由傅斯年输入国内,开阔了中国学者的国际视野,为中国史学走向世界,取得国际学术话语权奠定了基础。     

《中国史学史》课程教学的探索与实践

《中国史学史》是高校历史学专业一门基础课，课程容量大，时间跨度长，教学难度大。开课两年来，积极探索教学改革之路，注重教学内容的基础性和前沿性的统一，合理调配课程资源，传输科学技术和培养人文精神并举，取得了良好效果。     

“Exploratory experimentation” as a probe into the relation between historiography and philosophy of science

This essay utilizes the concept “exploratory experimentation” as a probe into the relation between historiography and philosophy of science. The essay traces the emergence of the historiographical concept “exploratory experimentation” in the late 1990s. The reconstruction of the early discussions about exploratory experimentation shows that the introduction of the concept had unintended consequences: Initially designed to debunk philosophical ideas about theory testing, the concept “exploratory experimentation” quickly exposed the poverty of our conceptual tools for the analysis of experimental practice. Looking back at a number of detailed analyses of experimental research, we can now appreciate that the concept of exploratory experimentation is too vague and too elusive to fill the desideratum whose existence it revealed.