亨普尔的律则解释及其在社会科学中的困难--有关解释的相关性问题

本文在亨普尔的律则解释模式——演绎-律则模式和归纳-统计模式适用于社会科学的假设下，通过对相关性问题以及高概要求的讨论，考察了I—S模式对社会科学的适用性。     

Hempel on scientific understanding

Hempel seems to hold the following three views: (H1) Understanding is pragmatic/relativistic: Whether one understands why X happened in terms of Explanation E depends on one's beliefs and cognitive abilities; (H2) Whether a scientific explanation is good, just like whether a mathematical proof is good, is a nonpragmatic and objective issue independent of the beliefs or cognitive abilities of individuals; (H3) The goal of scientific explanation is understanding: A good scientific explanation is the one that provides understanding. Apparently, H1, H2, and H3 cannot be all true. Some philosophers think that Hempel is inconsistent, while some others claim that Hempel does not actually hold H3. I argue that Hempel does hold H3 and that he can consistently hold all of H1, H2, and H3 if he endorses what I call the “understanding argument.” I also show how attributing the understanding argument to Hempel can make more sense of his D-N model and his philosophical analysis of the pragmatic aspects of scientific explanation.     

科学解释与科学理解——重思亨普尔覆盖律模型

根据一种传统的观点,科学的目标是解释而非理解.然而,包括爱因斯坦和亨普尔在内的许多著名科学家和哲学家都认为科学的目标是理解.但一些人坚持认为,即使这些著名科学家和哲学家用到"理解"这个词,他们只是随便一说;"解释是科学的目标"才是他们严肃认真的看法,至少对于亨普尔是如此.本文反驳了这一观点,探讨了"科学的目标是理解"这...     

On the equivalence of Goodman’s and Hempel’s paradoxes

Historically, Nelson Goodman’s paradox involving the predicates ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ has been taken to furnish a serious blow to Carl Hempel’s theory of confirmation in particular and to purely formal theories of confirmation in general. In this paper, I argue that Goodman’s paradox is no more serious of a threat to Hempel’s theory of confirmation than is Hempel’s own paradox of the ravens. I proceed by developing a suggestion from R. D. Rosenkrantz into an argument for the conclusion that these paradoxes are, in fact, equivalent. My argument, if successful, is of both historical and philosophical interest. Goodman himself maintained that Hempel’s theory of confirmation was capable of handling the paradox of the ravens. And Hempel eventually conceded that Goodman’s paradox showed that there could be no adequate, purely syntactical theory of confirmation. The conclusion of my argument entails, by contrast, that Hempel’s theory of confirmation is incapable of handling Goodman’s paradox if and only if it is incapable of handling the paradox of the ravens. It also entails that for any adequate solution to one of these paradoxes, there is a corresponding and equally adequate solution to the other.