On the origins and foundations of Laplacian determinism

In this paper I examine the foundations of Laplace’s famous statement of determinism in 1814, and argue that rather than derived from his mechanics, this statement is based on general philosophical principles, namely the principle of sufficient reason and the law of continuity. It is usually supposed that Laplace’s statement is based on the fact that each system in classical mechanics has an equation of motion which has a unique solution. But Laplace never proved this result, and in fact he could not have proven it, since it depends on a theorem about uniqueness of solutions to differential equations that was only developed later on. I show that the idea that is at the basis of Laplace’s determinism was in fact widespread in enlightenment France, and is ultimately based on a re-interpretation of Leibnizian metaphysics, specifically the principle of sufficient reason and the law of continuity. Since the law of continuity also lies at the basis of the application of differential calculus in physics, one can say that Laplace’s determinism and the idea that systems in physics can be described by differential equations with unique solutions have a common foundation.     

Interpreting cosmic no hair theorems: Is fatalism about the far future of expanding cosmological models unavoidable?

It may be tempting to interpret cosmic no hair theorems (establishing that, under certain conditions, a cosmological model with accelerating expansion approaches de Sitter metric in the future) as implying a form of fatalism about a future state of the universe. In this note I explore (rather general) philosophical and (more concrete) physical reasons to resist such temptation. There are good reasons to think that (even locally) futures of expanding cosmological models may be unlike de Sitter.     

“经济决定论”的退场——站在卢卡奇总体性思想的批判视角

"经济决定论"曾被非马克思主义者视为历史唯物主义的代名词,该论题的提出有着深厚的社会历史背景,对"经济决定论"的批判关涉到如何准确理解历史唯物主义的关键性问题,马克思主义创始人及后继者曾试图从不同层面表明确切立场,然而真正能从理论上给予全面批判的却始于卢卡奇,他借助"总体性"这一范畴重释马克思主义辩证法,从本体论、主体性、价值论三重维度给"经济决定论"以全面回击,最终迫使其黯然退场。     

On the borderline between Science and Philosophy: A debate on determinism in France around 1880

In the second half of the nineteenth century, a new interest in explosive chemical reactions, sudden release of energy in living beings, physical instabilities, and bifurcations in the solutions of differential equations drew the attention of some scholars. New concepts like triggering actions and guiding principles also emerged. Mathematicians, physicists, physiologists, and philosophers were attracted by this kind of phenomena since they raised a question about the actual existence of a strict determinism in science. In 1878 the mathematical physicist Joseph Boussinesq pointed out a structural analogy among physical instabilities, some essential features of living beings, and singular solutions of differential equations. These developments revived long-lasting philosophical debates on the problematic link between deterministic physical laws and free will. We find in Boussinesq an original and almost isolated attempt to merge mathematical, physical, biological, and philosophical issues into a complex intellectual framework. In the last decades, some philosophers of science rediscovered the connection between physical instabilities and determinism, both in the context of chaos theory, and in the debates on the Norton dome. I put forward a consistent historical reconstruction of the main issues and characters involved.     

论马克思主义历史决定论——兼评卡尔·波普尔《历史决定论的贫困》

马克思的历史决定论不同于以往的历史决定论,是建立在历史唯物主义和辩证法之上的历史决定论。它不是机械的,而是辩证的。它既承认历史发展的规律性,也承认人的主观能动性。我们要明确马克思主义历史决定论的本质内涵和主要特点,这对于我们正确认识和批判地看待各种历史非决定论,具有十分重要的意义。     

关于法律解释的原则与方法的几点思考

社会的发展让人们逐步认识到法律解释的重要性,对于法律解释的定性存在着法律决定论和法官主观论两种对立的立场,由此又导致了原则与规则适用的不同,为了解决疑难案件,就要进行必要的法律解释。法律解释方法多种多样,主要有文义解释、体系解释、目的性解释以及其他解释。     

自由选择如何可能——基于艾耶尔《自由与必然》的理解

基于意志自由和行为自由的区分,艾耶尔反思了决定论的误导性.从而提出一种弱决定论的观点:强调用人的思想意识的自由来捍卫人在被决定的前提下有限的自由权利;也就是把人的作用放在自由与必然的中介者位置.     

历史决定论与改变世界何以可能

有学者认为,承认改变世界的可能性与承认历史决定论是矛盾的,从而否定历史唯物主义是历史决定论。这种观点是不正确的。本文通过对马克思主义经典著作的考察,说明了历史唯物主义是历史决定论而不是历史非决定论,并从历史决定论与主体能动性的关系、单义决定论与或然决定论的关系、历史决定论与主体选择的关系、自由与必然的关系四个方面,论证了承认人能够改变世界与承认历史决定论是内在统一的。     

Emergent evolutionism,determinism and unpredictability

The fact that there exist in nature thoroughly deterministic systems whose future behavior cannot be predicted, no matter how advanced or fined-tune our cognitive and technical abilities turn out to be, has been well established over the last decades or so, essentially in the light of two different theoretical frameworks, namely chaos theory and (some deterministic interpretation of) quantum mechanics. The prime objective of this paper is to show that there actually exists an alternative strategy to ground the divorce between determinism and predictability, a way that is older than—and conceptually independent from—chaos theory and quantum mechanics, and which has not received much attention in the recent philosophical literature about determinism. This forgotten strategy—embedded in the doctrine called “emergent evolutionism”—is nonetheless far from being a mere historical curiosity that should only draw the attention of philosophers out of their concern for comprehensiveness. It has been indeed recently revived in the works of respected scientists.     

统计规律与因果性、决定论及非决定论──兼与统计因果论者商榷

本文通过分析随机事件的有规律性，说明了要概括统计规律的含义．使用统计决定论要恰当些．统计规律并不是非决定论的科学依据．