Pragmatism, Realism and Hermeneutics

This paper explores themethodological consequences of AmericanPragmatism for the social sciences. It alsocriticises some rival perspectives onmethodology of social research, in particularfalsificationist, realist and someanti-naturalist views. It is argued thatAmerican Pragmatism shows striking affinitieswith the genealogical method of history and thereflexive turn in cultural anthropology. It isalso argued that Pragmatism forces us to thinkdifferently about the relationship betweentheory and empirical research.     

波普尔证伪主义的心理学意义

心理学之所以选择或不选择实证的方法，并不是由实证方法本身的特点来决定的，这主要是由于不同的时代有不同的时代精神，不同的时代精神下又有着不同的科学标准。而科学哲学一方面是时代精神影响的结果，同时又是一个时代精神形成的标志，因此从科学哲学的角度来探讨心理学的发展就有着很重要的现实意义，该文章从四个方面分析了波普尔证伪理论对心理学发展所产生的影响。     

论知识增长方式与图书馆学知识的实证特征

提出了知识增长模式的"证实和证伪"原则,指出了人类知识必须经历证实和证伪检验才能发展和演化。分析了图书馆知识的证实和证伪特征;强调了知识一旦被证实或证伪都将作为真理的一部分进入人类知识体系。     

Falsificationism Falsified

A conceptual analysis of falsificationism is performed, in which the central falsificationist thesis is divided into several components. Furthermore, an empirical study of falsification in science is reported, based on the 70 scientific contributions that were published as articles in Nature in 2000. Only one of these articles conformed to the falsificationist recipe for successful science, namely the falsification of a hypothesis that is more accessible to falsification than to verification. It is argued that falsificationism relies on an incorrect view of the nature of scientific inquiry and that it is, therefore, not a tenable research methodology.     

波普尔的证伪主义和进化认识论

波普尔在上世纪完成他的证伪主义的逻辑学和方法论论证及其在政治哲学中的应用研究之后。从60年代中期开始，重点转向三个世界的本体论，进化哲学和生物学哲学的研究。其中对进化认识论研究占着一个突出的地位，他将猜测与反驳的知识增长过程看作是一个多样性的试探性解决，变异和自然选择过程，阐明了知识进步的达尔文机制，他提出和阐明一般进化论的原则，并将它应用于动物行为，生命世界的认识的发展，人类技术与文化的进步以及世界3的自主发展中去尽管当代许多哲学家认为，证伪主义已被“证伪”，我却认为，她是一只火凤凰，经过被批判的烈火的洗礼，却在进化认识论中获得重生。     

论拉卡托斯的科学研究纲领

拉卡托斯的科学研究纲领是在借鉴了库恩的常规科学解题方法、修正了波普尔的朴素证伪主义之后逐步发展起来的，由理论硬核和辅助性假设带两部分构成。此后，许多科学家和理论家便把科学研究纲领作为方法论来判断理论进步与否的标准。然而，拉卡托斯的科学研究纲领也存在许多亟待解决的问题，整合和重建科学研究纲领的理论内涵仍迫在眉睫。     

迪昂-蒯因问题及其解答

迪昂-蒯因问题是：在什么条件下，一个理论的某一假设可以被证据反驳？迪昂-蒯因论点对此给出否定的回答，即否认有这样的条件。仅仅承认迪昂一蒯因论点的逻辑合理性而否认其实用上的正当性，那就是所谓的“迪昂-蒯因弱论点”；如果同时承认迪昂一蒯因论点的逻辑合理性和实用正当性，那就是“迪昂-蒯因强论点”。波普尔所持的是弱论点而反对强论点，拉卡托斯和库恩虽然也反对强论点但却有条件地接受它。拉卡托斯的条件是：当一个研究纲领处于进步的问题转换；库恩的条件是：当一个范式处于常规科学。这里给出的贝叶斯方案是对拉卡托斯和库恩观点的逻辑重建。     

The Construction of Atom Models: Eliminative Inductivism and its Relation to Falsificationism

Falsificationism has dominated 20th century philosophy of science. It seemed to have eclipsed all forms of inductivism. Yet recent debates have revived a specific form of eliminative inductivism, the basic ideas of which go back to F. Bacon and J.S. Mill. These modern endorsements of eliminative inductivism claim to show that progressive problem solving is possible using induction, rather than falsification as a method of justification. But this common ground between falsificationism and eliminative inductivism has not led to a detailed investigation into the relationship, if any, which may exist between these two methodologies. This paper reviews several versions of eliminative inductivism, establishes a natural relation between eliminative inductivism and falsificationism, which derives from the distinction between models and theories, and carries out this investigation against a case study of the construction of atom models. The result of the investigation is that falsificationism is a form of eliminative inductivism in the limit of certain constraints.     

论波普对科学理性的挽救

本文认为波普的主伪主义或批判理性主义是生观念或标准的一个重大变革。这种学说用证伪主义取代证实主义,从证伪而不是证实的角度理解理性,认为理性并在不在于证实,而在于证伪,在于批判和否定,理性的态度就是批判的态度。本文拟分析证的伪主义或批判理性主义在合理性标准问题上的得与失。